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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Ad hoc interactions between devices over wireless networks in ubiquitous 
computing environments present a security problem: the generation of shared secrets 
to initialize secure communication over a medium that is inherently vulnerable to 
various attacks. However, these ad hoc scenarios also offer the potential for physical 
security of spaces and the use of protocols in which users must visibly demonstrate 
their presence and/or involvement to generate an association. As a consequence, 
recently secure device pairing has had significant attention from a wide community of 
academic as well as industrial researchers and a plethora of schemes and protocols 
have been proposed, which use various forms of out-of-band exchange to form an 
association between two unassociated devices. These protocols and schemes have 
different strengths and weaknesses – often in hardware requirements, strength against 
various attacks or usability in particular scenarios. From ordinary user‟s point of 
view, the problem then becomes which to choose or which is the best possible scheme 
in a particular scenario.  
We advocate that in a world of modern heterogeneous devices and 
requirements, there is a need for mechanisms that allow automated selection of the 
best protocols without requiring the user to have an in-depth knowledge of the 
minutiae of the underlying technologies. Towards this, the main argument forming the 
basis of this dissertation is that the integration of a discovery mechanism and several 
pairing schemes into a single system is more efficient from a usability point of view 
as well as security point of view in terms of dynamic choice of pairing schemes. In 
pursuit of this, we have proposed a generic system for secure device pairing by 
demonstration of physical proximity. Our main contribution is the design and 
prototype implementation of Proof-of-Proximity framework along with a novel Co-
Location protocol. Other contributions include a detailed analysis of existing device 
pairing schemes, a simple device discovery mechanism, a protocol selection 
mechanism that is used to find out the best possible scheme to demonstrate the 
physical proximity of the devices according to the scenario, and a usability study of 
eight pairing schemes and the proposed system.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This first chapter of the dissertation presents an overview of the research area 
along with motivation towards the need for the proposed system. In this 
chapter, we also describe our contributions followed by a list of our 
publications. At the end of the chapter, we have presented the organization of 
the remaining parts of the dissertation. 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
In ubiquitous computing, computing devices are spread around us, whereby 
they are interconnected with each other through either wireless or wired connectivity. 
They do not require continuous attention from the users in order to perform tasks as 
they are seamlessly integrated into the background. Ubiquitous computing 
environments are becoming popular and a common-place nowadays. It is due to the 
continuous advancements in communication technologies and proliferation of modern 
small hand-held devices. Many modern devices (e.g. smart printers, PDAs, smart 
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phones and cameras) support multiple communication channels and almost all of them 
use wireless technology in some form, such as Bluetooth, Infrared, Wibree, Zigbee, or 
802.11. Having wireless technology in these devices does not guarantee that all of 
these devices can also take advantage of Internet technology. However, those wireless 
enabled devices that cannot connect to Internet, can still take advantage of other co-
located devices in the vicinity by creating short-term or long-term associations. For 
example pairing a laptop with a printer or an access point in an airport lounge through 
the use of WiFi or Bluetooth (i.e. short-term association), and pairing a PDA with 
home devices in order to control them wirelessly (i.e. long-term association). Some 
other examples of pairing from everyday life include pairing a Bluetooth enabled 
headset with a mobile phone or MP3 player, pairing of Bluetooth keyboard with the 
desktop computer, and pairing of two mobile phones to exchange music files or other 
data. Since wireless communication is susceptible to eavesdropping, one can easily 
launch man-in-the-middle (MiTM), denial-of-service (DoS) or bidding-down attacks 
to break the secure pairing process. MiTM attack is a kind of active eavesdropping, in 
which an adversary can fully intercept the messages moving in both directions, 
modify or, corrupt the message, store messages for later replay, or insert new 
messages; In DoS attack, an adversary prevent communication between two legitimate 
communicating partners; and in bidding-down attack, the goal of an adversary is to 
fool (i.e. bid-down) the intended communicating partners to use weaker security than 
is possible. 
Over the last ten years significant research efforts have addressed the issue of 
secure device pairing. The main goal of the research community working on the 
secure device pairing issue is to provide mechanisms that give assurance of the 
identity of the devices participating in the pairing process and to secure them from 
being victims of eavesdropping attacks, such as MiTM attack. Achieving this goal is a 
challenging problem from both the security and the usability points of view. 
Security challenges emerge due to the ad hoc and dynamic nature of 
ubiquitous computing environments, in which devices do not know each other a 
priori, but still need to develop spontaneous interactions between themselves. This 
precludes the idea of pre-shared secret keys. Further, traditional key exchange or key 
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agreement approaches – such as Diffie-Hellman [1] in its original form – are not 
applicable in wireless environments due to their vulnerability to a MiTM attack. 
From a usability point of view, since most of the device owners are non-
technical, they want to have minimal and easy interactions with their devices during 
the pairing process. They do not want to remember a list of PIN numbers or secret 
passwords to establish the secure communication channel between a pair of devices 
for several scenarios or situations. Since many users do not have a deep technical 
understanding of the risks of pairing and there is a substantial cognitive overhead in 
remembering the different kinds of steps of secure pairing for several categories of 
devices and situations, many users may either deactivate security of the devices or 
select an inappropriate pairing method that may cause poor security. Therefore it is 
also challenging to develop more general, standardized and user-friendly interaction 
methods that might increase the usability of pairing schemes. Some other challenges 
are due to the devices‟ heterogeneity in terms of their communication channels, user 
interfaces, power requirements and sensing technology that make it hard to give a 
common or standard solution for secure pairing of devices.  
As a result of these challenges, a wide community of researchers has 
proposed many protocols and schemes [2-31] to deal with this issue. These protocols 
vary in their assumptions about the required capabilities in the devices, required 
human intervention, and in the way they utilize out-of-band or location-limited side 
channels including physical, audio, visual, short-range wireless channels like Near 
Field Communications (NFC), and also combinations of these. Consequently, there 
currently exists many options for an ordinary user to establish a secure channel 
between the devices from entering pins and passwords to verifying hashes of public 
keys and pressing buttons simultaneously on the two devices. This notion contradicts 
with the usability goal of secure device pairing schemes. As a motivating example 
towards this, consider the following scenario.  
Let us introduce Angela, who is working in a reputable organization. She 
organizes a meeting with representatives of some customers to give them a 
confidential briefing about a new product that her company is launching in the near 
future. The meeting is organized in a hotel equipped with modern smart devices, but 
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which is unfamiliar to Angela. On the meeting day, Angela is getting late, so she 
leaves her office in hurry and forgets to print some important documents required 
during the meeting. When she reaches the hotel, she wants to pair her laptop with a 
nearby printer to print the documents, without having to gain special permissions on 
the hotel network or pass files to a receptionist. That she has been allowed into the 
room with the printer is sufficient credentials. Next she goes to the meeting room, 
where she wants to pair her laptop with the projector securely, since the presentation 
carries some sensitive data. In addition to preventing eavesdroppers on a connection 
expected to last for several hours, Angela‟s laptop selects a mechanism that allows 
her to demonstrate to the room that the data is coming from her laptop. After her 
meeting and before leaving, she needs to discuss a confidential issue with her boss. At 
this time, she wants to pair her Bluetooth enabled headset with her mobile phone. 
Finally, when she finishes everything and needs to leave the hotel, she wants to 
provide the hotel with a signature stored on her work smart-ID card to use in 
authenticating their invoice.  
The scenario presented above embodies common problems in ubiquitous 
computing of ad-hoc interactions with unfamiliar devices and institutions, but can also 
make use of physical presence. It gives rise to two major concerns regarding the 
pairing process. First is how Angela makes sure that no one else can modify or read 
the sensitive data sent to the various devices. This requires setting up of keys for 
encryption, but also correct device selection in an unfamiliar environment. Second, 
while pairing the devices she needs to discover which pairing process can be applied 
in each situation. To the best of our knowledge, there is no common secure pairing 
system that best fits in all four situations of the scenario.  For example accelerometer 
based techniques (e.g. [13, 15, 18]) are not practical for large devices, and in a large 
room with a roof mounted projector radio signal and close-range techniques are likely 
to fail (e.g. [14, 28]). Where a choice of pairing techniques is available not all users 
are capable to judge which one is the best to use. Further, a pairing system must not 
increase the complexity and the cost of the devices by requiring expensive dedicated 
hardware in all devices, but should accommodate the existing capabilities of the 
pairing partners and should be flexible enough to accommodate future technologies.  
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In view of above facts, we believe that a common pairing infrastructure for 
ubiquitous computing environments can improve the usability of the pairing process. 
In this dissertation, we are presenting such a system. The proposed system integrates 
device discovery, several pairing schemes and a selection mechanism into a single 
model that facilitates association of any pair of devices in a wide range of scenarios 
by using the devices‟ existing capabilities and user preferences, and also assists the 
user  to select an appropriate pairing protocols and relieves him/her from choosing 
between more than two dozen [2-31] of pairing schemes. The detailed analysis of these 
schemes is given in chapter 2. 
1.2 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The major goal of this research work is to investigate and examine the 
feasibility of a framework based approach to device pairing. The main contribution of 
this dissertation can be summarized as the design and implementation of the proof-of-
proximity (PoP ) framework and the Co-Location (CoLoc) protocol that facilitates a 
generic device pairing system, which can be used in a wide-range of device pairing 
scenarios in ubiquitous computing environments. In pursuance of main contribution, 
we have also made several other contributions. We have summarized our overall 
contributions as below: 
 A proof-of-proximity framework and its prototype implementation. 
 The design and implementation of a novel Co-Location (CoLoc) protocol. 
 Critical and comparative analysis of existing device pairing schemes. 
 A simple device discovery mechanism for co-located devices. 
 A PoP protocol specification and selection mechanism to demonstrate the 
physical proximity. 
 A usability study of eight pairing schemes and the proposed system. 
Note that we built our solution on the advances already made in the field of 
device pairing. Since there had been a number of schemes already developed for 
providing secure device pairing in ad hoc networks; we believed in integrating these 
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schemes into the proposed system either in their original form or with some minor 
variations (subject to satisfying certain minimum requirements concerning their 
integration) to achieve our objectives. Majority of the researchers exploit the property 
of physical presence of devices in same space/location in some way to achieve their 
goal of device pairing. Consequently, in this dissertation, the term “PoP or Proof-of-
Proximity Protocols” refer to the set of those device pairing protocols that are 
implemented in the proposed system either in their original form or with some 
variations. 
1.3 RELEVANT PUBLICATIONS 
Following list of publications describe the author‟s prior work published, 
which is relevant to this dissertation. However, in this dissertation a more 
comprehensive description of the ideas and concepts involved and work undertaken is 
given as compared to the sum of these publications. 
1. Malkani, Y.A., D. Chalmers, and I. Wakeman. Towards a General System for 
Secure Device Pairing by Demonstration of Physical Proximity (Poster). in 
UBICOMP Grand Challenge: Workshop on Ubiquitous Computing at a 
Crossroads: Art, Science, Politics and Design. 6th and 7th January, 2009. 
Huxley Building, Imperial College, London. 
2. Malkani, Y.A., D. Chalmers, I. Wakeman, and L. D. Dhomeja. Towards a 
General System for Secure Device Pairing by Demonstration of Physical 
Proximity, in MWNS-09 co-located with IFIP Networking 2009 Conference, 
Shaker Verlag: Aachen, Germany. ISBN: 978-3-8322-8177-9. pg. 13-24. 
3. Malkani, Y.A. and L.D. Dhomeja, PSIM: A Tool for Analysis of Device 
Pairing Methods. International Journal of Network Security & Its 
Applications (IJNSA). ISSN: Print - 0975 - 2307, Online - 0974 - 9330, 
October 2009. 1(3). 
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4. Malkani, Y.A. and L. Das Dhomeja. Secure device association for ad hoc and 
ubiquitous computing environments. in IEEE 5th International Conference on 
Emerging Technologies, ICET 2009. pg. 437-442. 
5. Malkani, Y.A., D. Chalmers, and I. Wakeman, Secure Device Association: 
Trends and Issues, Book Chapter in Security of Self-Organizing Networks: 
MANET, WSN, WMN, VANET, October 2010. ISBN: 978-1-4398-1919-7, 
Editor:  A.-S.K. Pathan, Auerbach Publications. 
url:http://www.routledge.com/books/Security-of-Self-Organizing-Networks-
isbn9781439819197. 
6. Malkani, Y.A., D. Chalmers, and I. Wakeman. A Framework for Secure 
Device Pairing by Demonstration of Physical Proximity (Under review). in 
Frontiers of Information Technology (FIT-2010), Proceedings will be 
published by ACM. 
In (1 and 2), we presented our initial ideas and the position of our research to 
a wider community of researchers in order to get their feedback. Some content 
presented in chapter 1 and 6 is from (2). In (3), we presented the details of a 
tool designed to test the usability of pairing schemes and also presented the 
results of an early usability study that become the basis for the usability study 
presented in chapter 5. In (4), we have presented the short survey of the state 
of the art in secure device pairing and (5) is the extended version of the (4). A 
significant part of the contents presented in chapter 3 is from (5). In (6), we 
have described the details of the overall framework. In fact this paper covers 
the work presented in chapter 3 and 4 of this dissertation. 
1.4 OTHER PUBLICATIONS 
7. Khuhro, Z.-u.-A., A. Harrison, and Y.A. Malkani. RNA Structures 
Comparison using Graphs and Matrices (Short Paper). in IET BioSysBio'09 
Conference. 2009. Cambridge, UK.  
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8. Malkani, Y.A. and L.D. Dhomeja. Location aware device discovery for 
physically constrained environments. in IEEE 2nd International Conference 
on Computer, Control and Communication (IC4 09) 2009: ISBN: 978-1-4244-
3313-1.  
9. Elahi, M.A., Y.A. Malkani, and M. Fraz. Design and implementation of real 
time vehicle tracking system. in IEEE 2nd International Conference on 
Computer, Control and Communication (IC4-09) 2009: ISBN: 978-1-4244-
3313-1.  
10. Fraz, M., Y.A. Malkani, and M.A. Elahi. Design and implementation of real 
time video streaming and ROI transmission system using RTP on an 
embedded digital signal processing (DSP) platform. in IEEE 2nd International 
Conference on Computer, Control and Communication (IC4-09). 2009: ISBN: 
978-1-4244-3313-1. 
1.5 DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed analysis of the device pairing schemes along 
with some basic concepts and terminology. The main focus of this chapter is a 
detailed discussion of the state-of-the-art in device pairing along with an evaluation of 
existing solutions based on a comparative usability and security analysis.  This 
analysis proved to be helpful in drawing a scope for the problem we are addressing in 
this dissertation.  
The focus of chapter 3 is the details of the proposed PoP framework. It gives 
the reader an understanding of the architectural view of our system. In this chapter, we 
have also presented the details of Co-Location (CoLoc) protocol that is one of our 
main contributions and the core part of the system followed by the PoP protocol 
selection mechanism and some of the additional features of the proposed system.   
In chapter 4, the focus is prototype implementation of the proposed 
framework. In this chapter, we describe the software components of the proposed 
system and discuss the structure of the CoLoc protocol messages. Further, in this 
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chapter we also present the classification and description of the integrated PoP 
protocols followed by the demonstration of the prototype implementation. 
In chapter 5, we provide the details of a usability study that is carried out in 
pursuance of the hypothesis of the dissertation and to evaluate the proposed system. In 
this chapter, we present the evaluation of the proposed system through the analysis of 
the usability study results and its own design features followed by describing the 
wider view of the usability study results in general and their impact on the PoP 
protocol selection criteria in particular. 
Finally, chapter 6 provides the summary of the dissertation, achievements and 
contributions followed by the future work and closing remarks. 
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CHAPTER 2  
SECURE DEVICE PAIRING: 
TRENDS AND ISSUES 
 
 
 
The main focus of this chapter is the survey and analysis of the protocols and 
schemes that use various forms of out-of-band exchange to form an association 
preceded by describing some of the basic concepts and terminology and several 
possible attacks in device pairing model. At the end of this chapter, we present 
motivation towards the need of framework-based approach to secure device 
pairing. 
 
2.1 BASIC CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY 
2.1.1 RECAPITULATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRELIMINARIES 
Cryptography is the science of hiding data in order to provide information 
security at numerous levels and in several disciplines. The main objective is to control 
people/entities access to the information for which they must show their legitimacy. 
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To achieve this goal, over a long period many schemes [32-34] have been proposed, 
which are collectively known as cryptographic primitives. In cryptography, the 
original data is called the plaintext; the transformed or altered data is called the 
ciphertext. The process of transforming plaintext into cihpertext and ciphertext into 
plaintext is known as encryption and decryption. The algorithm which performs the 
transformation is called a cipher. Conventionally, a cryptosystem may consist of three 
basic components: keys, algorithms, and key management schemes. Symmetric 
cryptosystems use the same key for encryption/decryption; while asymmetric 
cryptosystems use a pair of keys (public/private) for encryption/decryption. In 
practice, symmetric-key based systems are much more efficient than asymmetric-key 
based systems; however asymmetric cryptography provides more efficient key 
management. Recently, another trend (known as hybrid cryptography) has began, in 
which asymmetric cryptography is combined with symmetric cryptography by 
transferring a secret key between communicating parties using an asymmetric scheme, 
and then performing encryption/decryption using symmetric schemes. Hash functions 
are cryptographic algorithms that take a string of any length as an input parameter and 
produce a short fixed-length hash code; while MACs are similar to hash functions, 
except that they require a secret key to authenticate the hash code on the recipient-
side. A digital signature is an alternative to MACs, which also provides data integrity 
and authenticity while the public key of the entity who signed the message is trusted. 
The difference between digital signatures and MACs is that MACs are generated and 
verified using the same secret key, while this is not the case for digital signatures. 
Further, digital signatures also provide non-repudiation. In scenarios where there is 
some doubt in the ownership of the sender‟s public key, digital certificates are used. 
Digital certificates are issued by a trusted third party and are messages that associate 
an identity to a public key. Interested readers can find further details of cryptographic 
primitives in [32-34]. 
2.1.2 COMMUNICATION CHANNEL 
In computer and communication systems, a communication channel, or simply 
channel, refers to a transmission medium that is used to transfer an information signal 
from one point to another; thus allowing two or more entities to communicate with each 
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other. A communication channel could be physical, such as a wired-channel, or 
wireless, such as a radio-channel. Since wired-channels use a physical connection 
between the sender (i.e. transmitter) and the receiver points, these channels are less 
vulnerable to interference, and are more secure and private. Wireless channels are 
much more open without any physical connection between sender and receiver points 
and are more vulnerable to noise and interference as compared to wired-channels. 
Thus, the major drawback of using wireless channels is the ease of interception. 
2.1.3 OUT-OF-BAND CHANNEL 
An out-of-band (OOB) channel is also known as location-limited side channel 
or simply physically constrained channel. In the literature of device pairing, the term 
communication channel or in-band channel is used for a fast and high bandwidth, but 
unreliable and insecure channel, such as 802.11 or Bluetooth; while the term 
physically constrained channel is used for a slow and very low bandwidth secondary 
communication channel. Such a channel usually has additional security guarantees 
(e.g. confidentiality or message integrity) that help to create a secure association 
between a pair of devices. In many cases, the additional security comes through the 
absence of vulnerability to attacks on the network and/or a requirement that 
engagement with the channel is physically visible to the users, and possibly being as 
simple as direct person-to-person verbal exchange. One of the major uses of OOB 
channel is to transfer messages for authentication during the pairing process. These 
channels can be categorized into two broad categories: input OOB channels and 
output OOB channels. The first category is usually used to enter some data into the 
device(s) during the pairing process, such as entering a PIN code or Passkey using a 
keypad. The latter category is used for verification purposes through the use of some 
output capability of the device, such as display. 
2.1.4 TRADITIONAL VS. UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING ENVIRONMENTS 
Traditional computing environments are usually composed of static devices 
(such as computers, printers, scanners), which use fiber-optic or copper wires, along 
with hubs, switches and routers to establish the communication network amongst 
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them and the most widely used communication mechanisms is through the use of 
traditional TCP/IP model. In these networks, devices rarely change their physical 
location, so they are not dynamic in nature. Since devices in traditional networks are 
static, they are connected with some power-outlet, and do not face the problem of 
battery exhaustion. Further, traditional networks usually work with the support of 
some infrastructure, such as on-line servers, which provide several useful services for 
the management and survival of these networks.  
Ubiquitous computing environments are usually composed of modern small, 
hand-held and embedded devices (such as PDAs, mobile phones, MP3 players, 
wireless gadgets etc), which use short-range wireless technology to establish the 
communication network amongst them. These networks are built spontaneously 
without relying on some fixed infrastructure. In contrast to traditional computing 
environments, ubiquitous computing environments are wireless, ad hoc and dynamic 
in nature. As a consequence, the security mechanisms and solutions proposed and 
developed for the traditional computing environments – in their original form – are 
not applicable in the scenarios of ubiquitous computing environments. Therefore, in 
order to provide secure communication between devices in ubiquitous computing 
environments, we need new security mechanisms that others have already started to 
propose and develop. For example, to ensure security and privacy of ubiquitous 
computing systems, several approaches, from authentication [35-37] and access control 
[38, 39] to distributed trust [40-43] have been proposed. Consequently, the issue of 
secure device pairing has also received significant attention from many researchers 
and a large set of device pairing schemes and protocols have been proposed [2-4, 7-
16, 19-29, 31, 44-47]. Towards this, in this dissertation, we have attempted to provide 
a light-weight infrastructure for the secure pairing of devices by integrating several 
pairing schemes along with a discovery mechanism into a generic framework. 
2.1.5 SECURE DEVICE PAIRING 
Secure device pairing (also known as security initialization, secure first-
connect, secure device association or simply device pairing in the literature) is the 
process of establishing a secure channel between two unassociated human-operated 
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devices over a short range wireless channel, such as Bluetooth, Infrared or 802.11. In 
the context of this dissertation, short range refers to a close proximity or single space 
(such as room) in which devices are operating.  
2.1.6 SECURE GROUP COMMUNICATION 
Apart from addressing the issue of establishing a secure session between two 
devices, we have also shown in this dissertation how to achieve secure group 
association through the demonstration of physical proximity. The details of the 
proposed scheme for secure group association are presented in chapter 3. 
A secure group is formed by the members who play roles as client, resource 
or both. Since secure groups are dynamic in nature and may vary over time, a group 
key management protocol is required to ensure the secrecy of the group. The main 
goal of group key management protocols is to timely provide the latest security 
relevant information to the legitimate group members in order to maintain the high 
standard of group security. There are two broad categories of group key management 
protocols, which are: centrally managed group key distribution protocols, and group 
key agreement protocols. In centrally managed group key distribution protocols a 
single entity (i.e. key server or group controller) is exploited for controlling the whole 
group; while group key agreement protocols do not require or concentrate on any 
central group controller or key server, but all the group members participate in the 
generation of group key material in a distributed manner [48]. Additionally, Rafaeli 
and Hutchison in their survey [49] highlighted the third category of group key 
management protocols, which is protocols based on decentralized architectures. The 
protocols designed within this category consider the division of a large group into 
more manageable subgroups, and each subgroup has a subgroup-manager; thus, trying 
to minimize the problem of concentrating the work in a single place [49].  
2.2 ATTACK TYPES IN DEVICE PAIRING MODEL 
As stated earlier, device pairing is the process of security initiation, which 
enables two entities/devices to establish a secure communication link between them in 
close proximity. However, achieving this goal in ubiquitous computing environments 
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is a challenging task due to the wireless, ad hoc and spontaneous interaction of 
devices. Since wireless communication is open to everyone, these systems are highly 
vulnerable to security risks, such as eavesdropping. Consequently, there are also 
similar kinds of security threats or attacks in device pairing scenarios. In this section, 
we briefly describe them. 
2.2.1 EAVESDROPPING 
The most significant risk in device pairing models is that the underlying 
communication channel is wireless (e.g. Bluetooth, 802.11, etc), which is open to 
everyone including bona-fide users as well as intruders or adversaries, and thus 
pairing partners cannot be physically secured the same way as two peers in a point-to-
point wired network. In an eavesdropping attack an adversary secretly listens to the 
conversation between pairing partners. The adversary‟s main goal is to obtain 
confidential information, including: public/private keys, location information, contact 
details, data of commercial value, or even devices‟ capabilities. To reduce the risk of 
eavesdropping general solutions include encryption, and physically securing the 
medium (line of sight transmission, frequency hopping etc.).  
2.2.2 MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE (MITM) ATTACK 
Simple eavesdropping is a passive attack, in which an adversary‟s goal is to 
steal some confidential information. However, active attacks are more dangerous, in 
which the main goal of an adversary is to fool the legitimate device(s) to associate 
with the adversary‟s device. A “Man-in-the-Middle” (MitM) attack is the most 
widespread and well known active attack against device pairing protocols. It is a kind 
of active eavesdropping, in which an adversary can fully intercept the messages 
moving in both directions, modify or, corrupt the message, store messages for later 
replay, or insert new messages. To successfully launch this attack an adversary should 
be able to establish two independent connections with the victims. In the event of a 
successful attack victims believe that they are communicating with each other and the 
messages received by them are from the legitimate source; while, it is not the case. In 
fact all conversation is passed through the adversary, who is able to illegitimately 
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analyze and modify the real data, launch denial-of-service (DoS) attack, and even 
impersonate one partner to gain control over the victim‟s device(s) or gain access to 
data or resources. Figure 2.1 depicts the scenario of a MiTM attack. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Man-in-the-middle attack scenario 
 
 
2.2.3 DENIAL-OF-SERVICE (DOS) ATTACK 
The general goal of an adversary launching a denial-of-service (DoS) attack is 
to prevent communication between wirelessly connected nodes. However, in the case 
of device pairing a DoS attack can prevent two legitimate pairing partners from 
establishing a secure channel. It is a general concept that this is the easiest attack that 
can be launched by an adversary in wireless environments. Since there has been less 
emphasis on the prevention of DoS attack in pairing scenarios, many of the pairing 
schemes are susceptible to a DoS attack. For example, in pairing schemes that use 
audio as an out-of-band channel, an attacker can launch DoS attack by creating a 
noisy environment for the user/devices. The noisy environment may prevent the user 
 - 17 - 
from properly participating in the pairing process.  In the case of visual out-of-band 
channels, this attack can be launched by manipulating the lights (dark, bright, flashing 
etc) so that bar codes, screens etc used to contain secure pairing information cannot 
be read. However, these kinds of DoS attacks can be recognized by the user, who can 
then try to eliminate them by changing the environment or by forcing the adversary 
not to do so in case of source detection.  
2.2.4 BIDDING-DOWN ATTACK 
The bidding-down attack is possible in scenarios where a list of choices to 
establish a secure channel is available, and the selection of the best pairing protocol is 
negotiated based on some criteria, such as device capabilities or user preferences. In 
this kind of attack, the goal of an adversary is to fool (i.e. bid-down) the intended pair-
able devices to use weaker security than is possible. For instance, when pairing two 
display and camera-equipped devices, an adversary could modify the capabilities of 
one of the devices into display-less and/or camera-less device (i.e. bidding-down) to 
force a radio-based pairing protocol to be used, which is easier to intercept without 
being detected.  
2.2.5 COMPROMISED DEVICES 
Compromised devices are a risk in any wireless system and are difficult to 
prevent at the protocol level. In the case of secure device pairing, it is possible that an 
adversary may install malicious code on the device(s). Then an adversary can access 
confidential information (e.g. shared secret) stored on the device or use it to gain 
authorized access to other available services. Further, a compromised device could 
suggest pairing with only the adversary‟s device or could run a weak pairing protocol. 
It is the user‟s responsibility to eliminate the chance of this attack by some 
mechanism, such as deploying security software to detect the malicious code or to 
restrict the physical access of the device to only those people whom he/she trusts.  
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2.3 DEVICE PAIRING IN AD HOC AND UBIQUITOUS 
COMPUTING ENVIRONMENTS 
The problem of secure device pairing continues to be a very active area of 
research in ad hoc and ubiquitous computing environments. The issue got significant 
attention from many researchers after Stajano et al. [2-4] highlighted the challenges 
inherent in secure device pairing. As a result, currently we have more than two dozen 
device pairing schemes including their variations. In this section, we present a survey 
of several approaches to device pairing along with a detailed comparative analysis 
(section 2.4). 
2.3.1 DEVICE PAIRING SCHEMES PROPOSED BY ACADEMIA 
2.3.1.1 DEVICE PAIRING REQUIRING WIRED OR CONSTRAINED CHANNEL 
In their seminal Resurrecting Duckling paper [3] Stajano and Anderson 
presented a policy-based mother-duckling security model that played an important 
role in raising the issue of secure device pairing among a wide community of 
researchers. Their work [2-4] has been considered as the first effort towards secure 
transient association between devices for ad hoc and ubiquitous computing 
environments. The proposed mother-duckling model maps the relationships between 
devices. Mother is a master device that imprints a duckling that is a slave device. The 
slave device remains in one of the two states: imprinted or imprintable. The slave 
device is in the imprintable state at the beginning or bootstrapping time. However, it 
switches from imprintable to the imprinted (paired) state once it has got the shared 
secret from its master device. The slave remains in this state until its death (i.e. while 
it keeps the shared secret provided by its master device). In fact the shared secret 
binds the slave device to its master device. As a consequence, the slave device 
remains faithful to the master device and obeys no one else. Since the shared secret is 
transferred from master to slave over a physical connection (such as using a cable) in 
plain-text form the proposed approach does not require complex cryptographic 
methods, such as Diffie-Hellman [1]. 
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Balfanz et al. [21] extended Stajano and Anderson‟s work and proposed a 
two-phase authentication method for pairing of co-located devices using infrared as a 
location limited side channel (also known as out-of-band channel). In their proposed 
solution pre-authentication information is exchanged over the infrared channel and 
then the user switches to the common wireless channel. Pre-authentication data 
contains cryptographic material as well as the complete address of the device. The 
proposed method exploited public key cryptography in which devices exchange their 
public keys over an insecure wireless channel followed by exchanging the hashes of 
respective public keys over the location limited side channel (i.e. infrared). Further, 
they are the first to introduce the concept of demonstrative identification (i.e. 
identification in the form of a representation of an object, e.g. printer in this room, 
display in front of me, etc) for authentication purposes in pairing process. Slightly 
different variations, of Balfanz et al.‟s [21] approach are proposed in [24-26, 50], 
which use infrared, laser and ultrasound as location limited side channels to transfer 
the pre-authentication data. 
2.3.1.2 DEVICE PAIRING USING SENSORS TECHNOLOGY 
Unlike the approaches described above, the idea of shaking devices together 
to pair them has become more common. Smart-its-Friends [13] was the first effort that 
proposed pairing of two devices using a common movement pattern and used 
accelerometers as an out-of-band channel. In this approach, two devices are held and 
shaken together simultaneously. Then common readings from the embedded 
accelerometers in the devices are utilized to establish the communication channel 
between the two devices. However, security has not been the major concern of Smart-
its-Friends. The follow-on methods to Smart-its-Friends are Are You With Me [45] 
and Shake Well Before Use [15]. In Are You With Me [45], the main goal was to 
show that accelerometer‟s data can be used to reliably determine that a set of devices 
are being carried by the same person. The authors showed that one can reliably 
determine whether the two devices are being carried by the same person or not using 
only eight seconds of walking data. However, one of the major limitations of the 
proposed system is that they require the user(s) to walk [45]. 
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Mayrhofer and Gellersen [15] extended Holmquist et al.‟s [13] approach and 
proposed two protocols to securely pair the devices. Both of the proposed protocols 
exploit cryptographic primitives with accelerometer data analysis for secure device-
to-device authentication. The first protocol use public key cryptography and is more 
secure as compared to the second protocol, which is more efficient and computes a 
secret key directly from the accelerometer‟s data. In second scheme, the user is 
required to hold and shake the devices together for approximately twenty seconds to 
generate a 128-bit shared secret [15]. Kirovski et al. proposed Martini Synch [51], 
another accelerometer based approach to securely pair the devices that use the idea of 
joint fuzzy hashing [44]. 
Another approach that requires shaking or moving patterns is Shake Them Up 
[14]. Authors suggest a movement-based technique for pairing two resource-
constrained devices that involves shaking and twirling them in very close proximity to 
each other. Unlike accelerometer-based schemes, this approach exploits the source 
indistinguishability property of radio signals and does not require embedded 
accelerometers. While being shaken, two devices exchange radio packets and agree on 
a key one bit at a time, relying on the adversary‟s inability to determine the source of 
each radio packet (i.e. the sending device).  
Recently, Varshavsky et al. [28] proposed Amigo a proximity-based 
technique for secure pairing of co-located devices. They extended the Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange protocol with the addition of a key verification stage. The proposed 
approach utilizes commonality of radio signals from locally available wireless access 
points to establish the secure channel between the devices. Any attacker who is not 
physically very close would see a different pattern of access point signal strengths. 
Radio-based approaches to secure device pairing either require no or minimal 
hardware and user involvement during the pairing process. However these schemes 
are not applicable in the scenarios where devices support only Bluetooth technology. 
Biometrics are a common technique for identifying human beings. Due to the 
success of biometric-based user authentication systems, researchers realized that 
many benefits could be achieved by combining biometrics with cryptography. As a 
consequence, Buhan et al. proposed two systems [20, 23] that utilize biometric data to 
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establish a secure channel between the devices. Both of the proposed systems are 
based on the Balfanz et al. model [21], and biometrics is used as an out-of-band 
channel. In Feeling-is-Believing (FiB) [23], Buhan et al. investigated grip pattern and 
proposed to generate a shared secret key from biometric data using quantization and 
cryptanalysis. In SAfE [20], keys are extracted from images during the pre-
authentication phase that are used for authentication in subsequent phase.  
2.3.1.3 DEVICE PAIRING USING NEAR FIELD COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 
Near-Field Communication (NFC) is a short-range, high-frequency, low-
bandwidth wireless connectivity technology defined by the NFC Forum [36]. Since 
NFC uses magnetic field induction to enable communication between devices it 
allows users to securely pair the NFC-enabled devices by simply touching them 
together or holding them in very close proximity of up to 10 centimeters. NFC 
enabled devices are capable of establishing a peer-to-peer network to exchange 
content and access services. It operates on the 13.56 MHz frequency with data 
transfer rate of up to 424 kilobits per second, with a bandwidth of 14 KHz. However, 
NFC in combination with other wireless technologies, such as Bluetooth or WiFi, can 
be used for exchanging a huge amount of data or can support longer communication. 
In NFC, there are two kinds of devices - active-devices that generate their 
own field, and passive-devices that retrieve power from the field generated by active-
devices. NFC supports two basic modes of communication: active-mode and passive-
mode. In active-mode, both of the devices generate their own magnetic field and 
require a power supply in each of them. While in passive-mode one of the devices (an 
active-device) generates its magnetic field and the other device (i.e. passive-device, 
such as a contactless smart card) is powered by the active-device. There are many 
scenarios where NFC can be used. One such common scenario is the pairing of a NFC 
enabled camera and computer. In that scenario user could transfer all the photos in 
camera into his/her computer just touching them together or putting them in very 
close proximity. The touch mechanism makes it clear for the user which two devices 
are selected for intended association and takes away the burden of selecting the right 
devices (i.e. discovery and device identification) from a long list of available devices. 
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Other possible applications/uses of NFC include smart posters, replacement of 
contactless-credit-cards with NFC-enabled mobile phones, and support services 
(through the use of voice clips) for the visually impaired people. Wi-Fi protected 
setup also incorporates one of the methods that use NFC as an out-of-band channel. 
Recently there has been much greater availability of this technology in commercial 
devices including Nokia 6131, Motorola L7, SAGEM my700X Contactless, LG600V 
and Samsung D500E.  
2.3.1.4 DEVICE PAIRING REQUIRING AUDIO/VIDEO TECHNOLOGY 
Based on the pairing protocol of Balfanz et al. [21], some other schemes are 
proposed through the use of audio and visual out-of-band channels. One such system 
is Seeing-is-Believing (SiB) [29]. SiB takes advantage of the common presence of 
cameras in modern handheld devices, and utilizes two dimensional bar codes for 
exchanging pre-authentication data (i.e. public keys) between the devices. In the 
proposed approach, device A encodes cryptographic material into a two-dimensional 
barcode and displays it on the screen, then device B reads it through a camera to setup 
an authenticated channel. In the simplest case SiB requires the first device (A) to have 
a display to show the 2D barcodes and the second device (B) a camera. Then the user 
is required to focus and place the camera of device B at the first device‟s (device A) 
screen properly to take a photograph of the displayed bar code. SiB supports several 
use cases based on the device capabilities.  For example, when the first device has a 
camera and the other device has only a display, then only the first device (camera-
equipped) can authenticate the other device – i.e. display only device (1-way 
authentication). In the second use case, when both devices are camera and display 
equipped, then both of the devices can authenticate each other by two protocol runs, 
one in each direction (2-way authentication). In another use case, when only one 
device has a camera and the other device has neither a camera nor a display, user can 
then print a two dimensional barcode on a sticker, containing the cryptographic 
material, and attach the sticker to the other (camera-less and display-less device) 
device. In this case, the user takes a photo of the sticker and performs the SiB protocol 
as usual.  
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Another pairing method that uses a visual out-of-band channel is proposed by 
Sexana et al. [7]. To reduce the camera requirement in one of the pairing devices in 
SiB, they extended the work of McCune et al. [29] and proposed an improvement to it 
through the use of simple light source, such as an LED, and short authenticated 
integrity checksums. In fact, they showed that mutual authentication can be achieved 
with a one-way visual channel, while SiB requires two visual channels, one in each 
direction (for full functionality). In the proposed scheme [7], device A needs to be 
equipped with a camera and device B with a single LED. Device A takes a video clip 
of a blinking pattern on device B‟s LED. Then the video clip is parsed to extract an 
authentication string.   
Loud and Clear (L&C) [31] and Human-Assisted Pure Audio Device Pairing 
(HAPADEP) [19] use audio as an out-of-band channel to establish a secure channel 
between the devices. The main idea of the L&C [31] scheme is to encode the hash of 
the first device‟s public key into a MadLib sentence (i.e. grammatically correct but 
nonsensical sentence) and transmit it over a device-to-human channel using a speaker 
or a display. The second device also encodes the hash of the received public key from 
the first device into the MadLib sentence and transmits it over a device-to-human 
channel using a speaker or a display. The user is then responsible for comparing the 
two sentences and accepting or rejecting the pairing. There are four variants of this 
approach: speaker-to-speaker, speaker-to-display, display-to-speaker, and display-to-
display. In the first variant, the user is required to compare and verify the two 
sentences vocalized by the pairing candidate devices. In the second variant, the user is 
required to compare the vocalized MadLib sentence with the sentence displayed on 
the other device. In the third variant, user is required to compare the displayed 
MadLib sentence on one device with the vocalized MadLib sentence from the other 
device. In the fourth variant, user is required to compare the MadLib sentences 
displayed on both of the devices. In all of the variants, the user is responsible for 
accepting or rejecting the pairing based on the results of comparison.  
Soriente et al. proposed HAPADEP [19], which is a follow-on from L&C 
[31]. Soriente et al. consider the problem of pairing two devices that have no common 
wireless communication channel, such as Bluetooth or WiFi, at the time of pairing. 
The proposed scheme uses only audio to exchange both public keys and hashes of 
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public keys. The proposed system consists of two phases: key transfer and key-
verification. In the key-transfer phase, first device (Device A) encodes cryptographic 
material along with protocol messages into a fast audio codec and plays the resulting 
audio sequence. The other device (Device B) records and decodes this audio sequence 
in order to obtain the key. This process is also repeated in the reverse direction so that 
Device A could get the key from Device B. In the second phase, each device 
computes a hash of the received public key and encodes it into a pleasant audio 
sequence, such as a melody. Then user is required to listen and compare the audio 
sequences played by both of the devices and accept or reject the pairing based on the 
results of comparison. This scheme is only applicable to those scenarios where both 
devices have a microphone and a speaker. 
2.3.1.5 DEVICE PAIRING REQUIRING HUMAN-TO-DEVICE OR DEVICE-TO-
HUMAN INTERACTIONS 
Soriente et al proposed Button-Enabled Device Association (BEDA). The 
main idea of the proposed approach is to transfer the short secret key from one device 
to the other using „button-presses‟ and then use that key to authenticate the public 
keys of the devices. A short secret key (21-bits) is agreed upon between the two 
devices via one of its four variants.  These variants are called button-to-button (B-to-
B), display-to-button (D-to-B), short vibration-to-button (SV-to-B) and long vibration-
to-button (LV-to-B). In fact, the only difference between these variants is the way first 
device (device A) transfers the bits of the generated short secret to the other device 
(device B). Bits of a short secret are encoded by the devices using the time-interval 
between two events, such as a button-press-event. For example, the first and basic 
variant (i.e. B-to-B) involves the user simultaneously pressing buttons on both of the 
devices within certain random time-intervals and each of these intervals are used to 
derive 3-bits of the short secret key.  In the D-to-B variant an event is a square that 
blinks on device-A's display, in the SV-to-B variant an event is a short vibration, 
while in LV-to-B an event is either the start or the end of a long vibration. For every 
event-notification that the user receives from device A, he has to press or release a 
single button at the same time on device B. It enables device B to calculate the same 
bits of shared secret that are transmitted from device A. 
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2.3.2 INDUSTRY EFFORTS FOR PROVIDING SECURE DEVICE 
PAIRING MECHANISMS 
2.3.2.1 BLUETOOTH 
Bluetooth [52] is a short range wireless technology that allows modern 
devices, such as mobile phones, PDAs, Cameras and other handheld devices, to 
communicate with each other over a distance of up to 100 meters. It works in the 2.4 
GHz ISM band, and is considered to be one of the simplest ways to wirelessly 
exchange information between two devices in close proximity. In order to establish a 
secure communication link between intended pairing devices, the user needs to go 
through the Bluetooth pairing set up procedure. In Bluetooth pairing, devices need to 
exchange a short passkey or PIN code to prove that the owners of both devices are 
agreed to pair the devices with each other. Below are the general steps involved in the 
Bluetooth pairing process: 
1. The pairing process starts when the first device (device-A), such as 
Bluetooth-enabled mobile phone or PDA, searches for other Bluetooth-
enabled devices in the vicinity. The list of found Bluetooth devices would be 
shown on the screen of device-A. Note that only those devices can be found 
that are already in Bluetooth discoverable mode and their visibility option is 
turned ON. 
2. Device-A selects the device-B (such as other mobile phone or PDA) from the 
available list of devices. Then, device-A asks the user to enter a PIN code or 
passkey. It could be any special code of the user‟s choice; however it must be 
remembered, because it needs to be entered on the other device (device-B). 
Note that in some of the resources/interface constrained device scenarios, it is 
not possible to enter the Passkey or PIN code. In that case, there is a fixed 
code, such as 0000, which the user is required to enter onto the other device.  
3. Once the user has entered the passkey on device-A, it sends it to the device-B. 
4. If device-B is not a resource constrained devices, it asks the user to enter the 
same PIN code or passkey; otherwise it simply uses its own standard/fixed 
passkey (e.g. 0000). 
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5. Finally, device-B sends back the user-entered passkey to device-A. If device-
B's passkey is the same as entered by device-A, then automatically a trusted 
association takes place between the devices.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Bluetooth pairing process 
 
2.3.2.2 WIRELESS USB ASSOCIATION (WUSB)  
The Wireless USB (WUSB) group was formed in 2004 to define the WUSB 
specifications that took about one year to complete. WUSB is a short-range (up to 10 
meters), high-bandwidth (110 Mbit/s) wireless radio communication technology, 
which is developed to simplify the process of establishing associations between a pair 
of wireless-enabled devices. The main goal of this technology is to replace wired 
USB. In WUSB, device-A (i.e. host-device) and device-B exchanges connection-host-
ID, connection-device-ID, and connection-key during the association process. This 
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information is utilized later on to setup secure communication between device-A and 
the device-B. WUSB supports two types of association models: cable-association 
model and numeric-association model. Device-A or host-device supports both of the 
models; while the other device having only USB ports supports the cable association 
model, and the device with only a display supports the numeric association model. 
The cable association model utilizes a USB cable to perform the first-time association 
between a host and a device. Once the association has been completed, the cable is no 
longer needed and future communications with the device can be entirely wireless.  In 
numeric association model, the first-time association is performed over the ultra-wide-
band radio. 
2.3.2.3 WI-FI PROTECTED SETUP (WPS) AND WINDOWS CONNECT NOW-NET  
The Wi-Fi Alliance officially launched Wi-Fi Protected Setups (WPS) in 
early 2007.  The goal was to provide a standard and simple way for easy and secure 
establishment and configuration of wireless home networks. Another effort for 
standardization of secure device association is Microsoft‟s Windows Connect now-
NET technology. It provides a way to set up secure wireless network, and works for 
both in-band wireless devices and out-of-band Ethernet devices.  
2.4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF DEVICE PAIRING 
SCHEMES 
As described above the issue of secure device pairing got significant attention 
from many researchers, after Stajano and Anderson in their seminal paper [3] 
highlighted the challenges inherent in secure device pairing. Since the secret key is 
transferred in plain-text in their proposed approach, it is susceptible to dictionary 
attacks. It also requires the same physical interface in both of the devices to transfer 
the secret, which makes such an approach inapplicable in scenarios where the devices 
do not have a common physical interface. Further, it is also difficult to carry the 
cables all of the time. However, Resurrecting Duckling and Talking to Strangers [21] 
both require minimal user interaction, which is an advantage from usability point of 
view.  
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The common drawback of Talking to Strangers [21] and some other similar 
approaches [24-26] (in terms of use of secondary-location-limited-side channel) is 
that they need some kind of physical interface (e.g. IrDA, laser, ultrasound, etc) for 
the pre-authentication phase and are vulnerable to a passive eavesdropping attack in 
the location limited side channels, e.g. two remotes and one projector. Further, some 
of the location limited side channels, such as infrared and laser, are highly vulnerable 
to denial of service (DoS) attacks. Those schemes which use audio and/or visual out 
of band channels [7, 29, 31] for secure device pairing also suffers from a few 
problems. For example, SiB [29] requires that one of the peers must be equipped with 
camera; while in L&C [31] a speaker and/or display is required. Camera equipped 
devices are usually prohibited in high security areas; while the latter is not suitable for 
hearing-impaired users. Further, bar code scanning requires sufficient proximity and 
light in SiB; while L&C and HAPADEP [19] places some burden on the user for 
comparison of MadLib sentences and audible sequences respectively. An adversary 
can easily subvert bar code stickers on devices in SiB to launch the successful attack, 
while ambient noise makes authentication either weak or difficult in L&C as well as 
in HAPADEP. For example in SiB, a user wants to pair his/her handheld device with 
a display-less printer to print a confidential document. Since the printer is display-
less, a bar code sticker is attached to it. It is possible that an adversary subverts the bar 
code or swaps it with another printer available in the next building. In that scenario, 
once the pairing is established, and user sends the document to the printer, it is printed 
by the adversary‟s printer in next building. However, this scheme is more secure in 
the scenarios where both of the devices are camera-equipped and also have displays. 
Since [7] is a variation of SiB, so this scheme has some of the same limitations as 
SiB, such as requiring close proximity and a camera in at least one of the devices. 
Further, in the case of L&C and HAPADEP more research and development 
is required in the areas of speech engines, audio codec technology as well as in L&C 
Dictionary. Moreover, L&C and HAPADEP also suffer from the fact that users 
cannot be forced to carefully listen to the audio played by the devices. It means a user 
who does not understand the importance of security might not pay proper attention to 
the sound played by the devices, and thus can easily ignore the verification stage, and 
may confirm a false match. Secure pairing of devices by shaking them together is an 
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interesting approach. However, these schemes require embedded accelerometers in 
both of the devices. Further, shaking devices together is always not possible, since 
there is large variety of devices, such as printers, projectors and laptops that cannot be 
held and shaken together simultaneously. 
In contrast to the above approaches, AMIGO [28] and Shake Them Up [14] 
exploit radio signals to establish the secure channel. Since AMIGO uses the similarity 
of radio signals from the nearby access points, it is not applicable in scenarios where 
the radio data is not available to process, or where the wireless network is easy to 
eavesdrop on while remaining physically hidden to the bona-fide users. Further, it is 
hard to identify the intended device in AMIGO when many other devices surround it, 
because in the proposed scheme calculated physical proximity is of coarse granular.  
Moreover, it is also a fact that in many developing countries 802.11-based wireless 
technology is less popular compared to Bluetooth technology that is common due to 
the widespread use of mobile phones. Shake Them Up is susceptible to attack by an 
eavesdropper that exploits the differences in the baseband frequencies of the two 
radio sources. Biometric based solutions to device pairing are considered to be good 
from the usability point of view in which biometrics is used as an out-of-band 
channel. The reason is that biometric-based channels put little cognitive load on the 
users. However, the calculations required to accurately recognize the biometric-
patterns are a heavy burden on its systems. Since no two biometric measurements, 
even coming from the same user and using the same measurement setup are identical; 
the issues regarding the accuracy of recognition techniques still need more research 
and improvement. Another drawback of this approach is that it requires biometric 
readers in both of the devices. 
Bluetooth pairing requires the human operator to put the communicating 
partners into discovery mode. After discovery and selection of a device, the channel is 
secured by entering the same PIN or password into both devices that gives rise to a 
number of usability and security issues [17, 53]. For example, a short password or 
PIN number makes it vulnerable to dictionary or exhaustive search attacks. In [17], it 
was shown that an adversary can easily derive a 4 digit PIN from an eavesdropped 
communication during pairing process in less than 0.06 seconds on a common 
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computer by mounting brute force attack. Further, in Bluetooth pairing an adversary 
can eavesdrop to break the security from a long distance using powerful antennas. As 
a consequence, the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG) reacted to these concerns 
by developing Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) [54]. The SSP supports four association 
modes: passkey entry, numeric comparison, just works, and an out-of-band model. 
Passkey entry mode is designed for two kinds of scenarios: first, where one of 
the devices has a display and the other an input capability (such as numeric keypad). 
Second, where both of the devices are capable of entering numeric input through a 
simple numeric keypad. In former case, a 6-digit number is shown on the display of 
the first device, which is then entered into the second device by the user. In the latter 
case, the users of the intended pairing devices are required to enter the same 6-digit 
number in each device. 
Numeric comparison mode is designed for the scenarios where both of the 
devices have displays, which are capable of showing a 6-digit number and allowing 
the user to enter a binary input (i.e. „yes‟ or „no‟) during the pairing process. In the 
pairing process, user is shown 6-digit number on displays of both of the devices, then 
user is responsible for comparing the numbers and accepting or rejecting the pairing 
based on his/her observation. 
Just work mode is designed for the scenarios where either one or both of the 
device has neither an output (display) nor an input (keypad) capability for entering or 
displaying the numbers. This scheme does not require any user interactions apart from 
asking/prompting the user to accept a connection. This scheme is suitable for resource 
constrained devices, such as headsets; however it does not provide any protection 
against MiTM attack. 
Out-of-band mode uses a secondary source of communication (such as NFC) 
to exchange the security relevant information required during the pairing process. 
This is designed for the situations where pairing devices use wireless technology 
other than Bluetooth for the purpose of device discovery and exchange of 
cryptographic material. Since in this mode the security relevant information required 
for pairing is exchanged through out-of-band channel, the level of protection against 
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eavesdropping and MiTM attacks is dependent on the out-of-band channel and the 
mechanisms used for exchanging that information. SSP addresses the two main 
concerns of the users community using Bluetooth technology, which are: simplicity of 
the pairing process and security, however recently some of the security vulnerabilities 
are found in SSP [55, 56]. So far as NFC is concerned, it is an extremely short-range 
technology compared to other short-range technologies, such as Infrared and 
Bluetooth. Therefore in many scenarios NFC is used in combination with Bluetooth, 
where NFC is used for authenticating (pairing) a Bluetooth session used for the 
transfer of data. NFC setup time is much shorter than Bluetooth. NFC requires less 
than 0.2ms to set up the connection; while Bluetooth requires approximately 6 
seconds. In [57], authors described different possible type of attacks on NFC. For 
example, NFC offers no protection against eavesdropping and is also vulnerable to 
data corruption and data modifications [57]. However, it is practically impossible to 
launch MiTM attack in NFC, especially when Active-Passive communication mode is 
used [57]. The WUSB project is perceived to have failed at the end of 2008 after the 
withdrawal of Intel. Two major reasons that play a role in its failure are the need of a 
power supply cable for the WUSB devices and the consumption of a large amount of 
energy.  
Some other efforts toward providing secure device pairing include Lokey 
[22], manual authentication [27],  and some of the older approaches [58-61] that 
involves image comparisons. LoKey uses SMS messages to authenticate key 
exchanged over the Internet, which incurs substantial monetary cost and delay. 
Gehrmann et al [27] proposed several manual schemes that enable handheld devices 
to authenticate their public keys by some kind of user interaction. In the proposed 
schemes, the user manually exchanges short message authentication codes between 
the devices.  These short message authentication codes are strings of very short length 
consists between 16 to 20 bits. For example, in one of the proposed method user is 
required to compare the short strings displayed on the screens of intended pair able 
devices. While, in another case in which one of the device is display-less, user is 
required to type the short string displayed on first device onto the other device (i.e. 
display-less device). The early approaches [58-61] encode cryptographic material, 
such as hash codes, into images and ask the user to compare them on both of the 
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devices. These approaches exempted the user from erring and burdensome process of 
byte-by-byte comparing of cryptographic hashes, however they require high-
resolution displays, which restrict these approaches to only specific types of devices, 
such as desktop computers, laptops, PDAs and other high-end devices. Finally in table 
2.1, we have summarized the features of some of the device pairing schemes, which 
are described in this chapter and also well known in the literature of device pairing. 
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Pairing Scheme Minimum hardware or 
equipment required in 
each of the device 
Human/User effort required Out-of-
band/Location-
limited secondary 
channel 
Device A Device B 
Resurrecting Duckling 
Security Model 
A cable and the same physical 
interface (e.g. USB port) on 
both of the devices 
Set up cable connection between the 
devices 
Cable 
Talking to Strangers Infrared (IrDA) port on both of 
the devices 
Set up infrared (IrDA) connection 
between the devices 
Infrared (IrDA) 
Smart-its-Friends 2D accelerometers on both of 
the devices 
Move/shake devices together 
simultaneously until response signal 
received 
Accelerometer/Motion/
Tactile 
Are You with Me? 2D accelerometers on both of 
the devices 
Walk around to shake the devices 
(sensors) for certain time period 
Accelerometer/Motion 
Shake Well Before Use 2D accelerometers on both of 
the devices 
Move/shake devices together 
simultaneously until response signal 
received 
Accelerometer/Motion/
Tactile 
Seeing-is-Believing Display Camera Properly place camera of device B at 
the displayed bar code on device A 
with sufficient proximity and take the 
photograph 
Visual 
L&C (Display-Speaker) Display Speaker Compare the MadLib sentence 
displayed on the screen of device A 
with the vocalized MadLib sentence 
from device B 
Combination of audio 
and visual 
L&C (Speaker-Speaker) Speaker Speaker Compare the two vocalized MadLib 
sentences from both of the devices 
Audio 
HAPADEP Speaker Microphone Compare two audible 
sequences/melodies 
Audio 
Shake Them Up 802.11 
network 
card/interface 
802.11 
network 
card/interface 
Shake/twirl/move devices around until 
pairing is done or response signal 
received 
Combination of 802.11 
and motion 
AMIGO 802.11 
network 
card/interface 
802.11 
network 
card/interface 
Shake/wave hand near the device until 
pairing is done or response signal 
received 
Combination of 802.11 
and tactile 
BEDA (Button-to-Button) A single button on both of the 
devices 
Press button on both of the devices 
simultaneously with random time-
intervals until response signal received 
Tactile 
BEDA (Display-to-
Button) 
Display A single 
button 
Press and release button on device B 
whenever display of device A flashes 
Tactile 
BEDA (Short Vibrations-
to-Button) 
Vibration 
capability 
A single 
button 
Press and release button on device B 
whenever device A vibrates 
Tactile 
BEDA (Long Vibrations-
to-Button) 
Vibration 
capability 
A single 
button 
Press and hold the button on device B 
while the device A vibrates 
Tactile 
Table 2.1: Features summary of the well known device pairing schemes 
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2.5 THE NEED FOR A FRAMEWORK-BASED APPROACH 
TO SECURE DEVICE PAIRING 
Each of the proposed schemes we have surveyed has strengths and 
weaknesses – often in hardware requirements, strength against various attacks or 
usability in particular scenarios. Therefore, we can conclude that no one has yet 
devised a pairing protocol, which is generic enough to accommodate a very large set 
of device pairing scenarios and can be considered as a standard solution for 
ubiquitous computing environments.  Currently available schemes for secure device 
pairing vary in the strength of their security, the level of required user intervention, 
their susceptibility to environmental conditions and in the required physical 
capabilities of the devices as well as the required proximity between the devices. 
Some of these techniques consider devices equipped with infrared, laser or ultrasound 
transceivers, whilst others require embedded accelerometers, cameras and/or LEDs, 
display, microphone and/or speakers. Some techniques exploit the knowledge of radio 
environment to securely pair the devices; others require the user‟s careful attention 
and significant manual intervention in pairing process. Further, most of the prior work 
on secure device pairing considered demonstrative approach (i.e. requires user 
involvement and/or manual efforts to identify the intended partner) to identification 
and discovery of the intended pair able co-located device. For example in SiB [29] 
and the Resurrecting Duckling Security Model [3], the discovery of the intended pair 
able device is performed manually; while in Talking to Strangers [21] communicating 
partners exchange their connectivity information over the secondary channel (i.e. 
infrared). However, in many situations automatic device discovery is required [7]. If 
we continue to multiply the number of manual or out-of-band discovery mechanisms, 
users will become confused about the selection of device discovery method during 
pairing process. For instance, a user wanting to create an association of a mobile 
phone having a microphone, speaker, camera, display and infrared with another 
mobile phone having microphone, speaker, display, no camera and no infrared might 
be confused about the varied types of manual or out-of-band possibilities for device 
discovery [7]. We therefore agree with the view proposed by Saxena et al. [7] that it 
should not be the user‟s responsibility to figure out how and which method to use for 
device discovery each time; instead an automatic device discovery should take place. 
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It is therefore appropriate to investigate ways of integrating different pairing 
protocols and discovery mechanism within a general architecture for providing secure 
and usable pairing mechanisms for a large set of ad hoc scenarios in ubiquitous 
computing environments. Such an architecture should facilitate choice of the best 
pairing scheme, considering device capabilities, environmental limitations, user 
preferences and the balance between security and usability. We realized this need and 
proposed a framework-based approach to deal with this issue. In next chapter, we 
present the details of the proposed framework. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE PROOF-OF-PROXIMITY 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we present the design goals, requirements and assumptions 
along with details of the system architecture of the proposed framework. We 
also present the details of the Co-location (CoLoc) protocol, which is core part 
of the proposed framework. Further, we describe the protocol selection 
mechanism that enables the devices to agree on a common PoP protocol. At the 
end of this chapter we also describe some of the additional features of the 
proposed system. 
 
3.1 DESIGN GOALS 
The major goal of this research is to design a system that facilitates 
association of any two co-located devices by demonstration of physical proximity 
through the integration of discovery mechanism and PoP schemes. Note that PoP 
schemes are either derived/extended from existing pairing protocols or taken in their 
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original form to provide the authenticity of the physical proximity of devices. These 
pairing schemes exploit various forms of OOB channels. Note that in the literature of 
device pairing OOB channel refers to a secondary channel, that work along with the 
primary in-band channel, such as Wifi or Bluetooth, with additional security 
guarantees. Due to these features, OOB channels are helpful in developing secure 
device pairing protocols/schemes. 
The three main goals of the proposed system are described below. 
 Generality: Generality is one of the main goals of the proposed system. The 
system should be applicable in a wide range of device pairing scenarios in 
ubiquitous computing environments, capable of incorporating existing pairing 
schemes and can be extended without major modifications in the design.  
 Usability: From a usability point of view, the system should be simple to 
understand, and easy to use for an ordinary user. 
 Security: Our security goal is twofold. Firstly, the system should be capable 
of establishing the secure session between two previously unassociated 
devices through proving the physical proximity of the devices involved in the 
pairing process. Secondly, all the communication between the entities of the 
system must be secured. 
3.2 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
To achieve the above mentioned goals, we have identified some of the major 
requirements described below: 
(A) A mechanism is required that facilitates the discovery of possibly co-located 
devices in the vicinity. 
To meet this requirement, we have designed a simple registration and 
discovery mechanism, which is presented in section 3.4.1.4. 
 - 38 - 
(B) A set of protocols or schemes is required that demonstrates the physical 
proximity of the two devices. 
We have already presented a detailed survey of the state-of-the-art in device 
pairing in the previous chapter, in which a detailed list of pairing protocols is 
presented. These pairing protocols and/or their variations could be used to 
demonstrate the physical proximity of devices. Hereafter in this thesis, the term „PoP 
protocols‟ refers to the set of pairing protocols that are implemented in the proposed 
system either in their original form or with some variations to facilitate the 
demonstration of physical proximity through the use of out-of-band channels. This set 
is chosen to demonstrate the concept, not to limit the use of others. 
 (C) A generic protocol is required that integrates the discovery mechanism and 
a set of PoP protocols and exchanges all the other required information/messages 
between several entities of the system in an encrypted form. 
We have designed the Co-Location (CoLoc) protocol to meet this 
requirement, which is presented in section 3.5. 
(D) Users should have some control on the selection of PoP protocols, and the 
level of required user interaction. 
The proposed system is capable of getting user‟s preferences and considers 
them during the PoP protocols selection phase. We have presented the details of the 
selection mechanism of PoP protocols in section 3.6. 
(E) The ability to modify PoP protocol selection behaviour at run-time. 
The protocol selection mechanism uses an XML-based policy as PoP 
protocols selection criteria, which is defined in terms of required device capabilities 
and constraints over PoP protocols. Since, the criterion for the selection of PoP 
protocols is described in an XML-based protocol specification and selection policy 
file; it can be changed / modified at run-time.  
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3.3 DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS 
We are considering ubiquitous computing environments, in which devices 
communicate with each other through short-range wireless technology, such as 802.11 
or Bluetooth. They discover each other using our proposed registration and discovery 
mechanism. We are not considering extremely resource constrained devices, such as 
sensor nodes. Instead, we are considering those ubiquitous computing devices, which 
have reasonable battery power and computational capabilities, e.g. mobile phones, 
cameras, PDAs, laptops, printers etc. These devices are capable of symmetric 
encryption/decryption, public key based encryption, hashing, signature verification, 
and have unique device-id or address. Further, devices know their location through 
some location system already installed in the environment or through their own 
hardware/software, such as GPS (Global Positioning System). The location 
information is useful in the discovery process. We assume that the co-location server 
is a trusted, uncompromised and tamper resistant (or at least tamper evident) device. It 
is also capable of performing symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations. 
Since, the co-location server is very light-weight; it might be run with other local 
services (e.g. DNS, print) or any other server, which is part of some existing security 
infrastructure to limit the deployment costs. Alternatively, it could also be installed 
into a dedicated low-cost small device. Then each device needs to perform one time 
demonstrative discovery of the server device in order to build trust. We are 
considering all the devices registered with the same co-location server as potentially 
co-located and each co-location server is responsible for handling a particular domain 
or location. We believe that due to the modern low-cost small ubiquitous computing 
devices that have now reasonable battery and computational power, one co-location 
server per scope is feasible.  
3.4 SYSTEM DESIGN 
In figure 3.1, we have shown the high-level architecture of the proposed 
system, which illustrates three phases. The first two phases are registration and 
discovery of the device(s), and the third phase is selection, initiation and execution of 
the PoP protocol. Figure 3.2 shows the two major components of the system, which 
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are the co-location server and the device. These two components are composed of 
several other software components, which are described in the implementation 
chapter (chapter 4). 
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Figure 3.1: High-level architecture of the proposed system 
We advocate that device or service registration and discovery mechanisms play 
an essential role in modern communication systems and there is an immense literature 
on service discovery to date. However, as discussed in chapter two, most of the prior 
work on device pairing considered a demonstrative approach to identification and 
discovery of the intended co-located device and it is assumed that the discovery 
process would be done by the user. Additionally, we also argued that most of the time, 
it is difficult for an ordinary user to identify the correct discovery option for a given 
scenario and it should not be the user‟s responsibility to figure out how and which 
method to use for device discovery each time, instead an automatic device discovery 
should take place. In pursuit of this argument, we have designed and integrated a 
device registration and discovery mechanism (i.e. first two phases) in the proposed 
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system, which is described in section 3.4.1.4 preceded by a brief summary of some of 
the relevant discovery schemes. 
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Figure 3.2: Two major components of the proposed system 
In the third phase, the goal is to prove that both of the devices (i.e. client and 
resource device) are in close physical proximity through the use of one of several 
available PoP protocols. The registration, discovery and proof of physical proximity 
are integrated into Co-Location (CoLoc) protocol, which is core part of the system 
and one of our main contributions as well. The CoLoc protocol is described in section 
3.5 in detail, however we are presenting the overview of the overall system as below: 
1. First of all resource device(s) register their capabilities with an easily found 
database stored on the co-location server. New devices can be added while the 
system is running. 
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2. When two devices need to associate, the client queries the co-location server 
to acquire the required information of suitable resource device(s).  
3. The co-location server prepares a device list containing necessary information 
for selecting and contacting the resource device in order to initiate the proof-
of-proximity phase. 
4. Based on the information from the co-location server and user preferences, 
the client first goes through the PoP protocol selection process and then 
initiates the secure association initiation process with the selected resource 
device. Different interactions to demonstrate physical proximity are possible 
and the selection requires a selection criterion along with device capabilities, 
constraints on pairing schemes and/or user preferences. 
5. Both of the devices (i.e. client and resource) execute the commonly agreed 
PoP protocol for the purpose of demonstrating their physical proximity in 
order to establish the secure session. Note that secure pairing is achieved only 
when physical proximity between both of the devices is proved. 
3.4.1 DEVICE(S) REGISTRATION AND DISCOVERY MECHANISM 
As described earlier there is a huge amount of literature on service discovery in 
general; however during the last ten years many discovery protocols have also been 
proposed to facilitate dynamic discovery of services/devices in ubiquitous computing 
environments. Some well known discovery protocols include Service Location Protocol 
(SLP) [62], Bluetooth Service Discovery Protocol (SDP) [63, 64], Microsoft‟s 
Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) [65] and Jini [52, 66]. Each has its own design 
considerations. For example, SDP supports only Bluetooth device/service discovery; 
while Jini is restricted to Java applications, SLP and UPnP are designed for TCP/IP 
networks; however UPnP is targeted to small or home based computing environments, 
while SLP is targeted to both from small to large-scale enterprise networks. Detailed 
comparisons of discovery protocols can be found in [67-69]. However for the sake of 
completeness of this thesis we are presenting some of the relevant discovery protocols 
followed by the proposed device registration and discovery mechanism. 
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3.4.1.1 SERVICE LOCATION PROTOCOL (SLP) 
Service Location Protocol (SLP) [62, 68, 70] is a discovery protocol 
developed by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) working group for service 
registration and discovery within a particular location or scope. It is designed for 
small to large scale enterprise networks. There are three major components of SLP, 
which are known as agents: Directory Agent (DA), User Agent (UA), and Service 
Agent (SA). DA is responsible for providing the directory services. SA advertises the 
location information along with the service-attributes on behalf of a service through 
registration process, and UA on behalf of the client application sends service 
discovery requests to a DA. 
 
User Agent 
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Service Req. 
 
Figure 3.3: An illustration of service registration and discovery mechanism in SLP 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the interaction mechanism between the three 
components of SLP in a small or Local Area Network. First of all DA announces its 
presence through periodic scoped-multicasting on a well known channel. A UA or SA 
discovers the address of the DA through some mechanism, such as listening to a DA 
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advertisement message passively or actively multicasting discovery message to the 
SLP multicast network address (i.e. 239.255.255.253). It is also possible to configure 
the DA address statically through Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) 
[71]. 
 Once an SA discovers a DA, it registers with it by sending a service 
registration message. Service advertisements are made through the use of a service 
URL and service template. The registration message contains the URL for the 
advertised service including its lifetime. An SLP service is described in the form of 
set of service attribute-value pair. A sample SLP service template for a print service is 
given below: 
 
 
service:printer://lj2420dn.FONT.susx.ac.uk:1024/ 
scopes = FONT, adminstrator 
printer-name=lj2420dn 
printer-network-name = Inf-pev-5c4-bw 
printer-location = Pevensey II, Room 5C4 
color-supported = true 
... 
... 
... 
 
 
As stated, when a UA requests a service, it contacts a known DA by sending a 
service request/query to obtain the service URL. Once the UA receives the service 
URL, it can access the service pointed to by the returned URL. DA is an optional 
component in SLP; therefore, in the scenarios where there is no DA available, the UA 
and SA discover each other directly through a multicast mechanism. 
3.4.1.2 JINI TECHNOLOGY 
Jini [66] is a java-based service registration and discovery technology 
developed by Sun Microsystems.  Jini provides service/device registration, discovery 
and communication mechanisms for ad hoc networks. The core part of Jini technology 
is a set of protocols known as discovery-join-lookup. 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the functionality of these protocols. On bootstrapping, 
services look for a lookup service and register themselves with it. This process is 
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known as the Discovery and Join process. During the registration process Jini services 
upload their service-object along with service attributes in a Lookup Table of the 
lookup service. Then, when a client needs a service, it also looks for a lookup service 
to find out the required services and to download the service-object. Once the client 
downloads the service-object from the lookup service, it directly contacts the service 
for further communication. This is known as the Lookup process. As in SLP, Jini 
lookup servers containing Lookup Tables serve the purpose of a directory. However, 
unlike SLP, Jini does not support directory-less mode and it always needs at least one 
lookup service. Further, in contrast to SLP, Jini services are described in Java. 
Service Provider Lookup Service Client
Search for lookup service
Lookup service found
Service-object/service-attributes
Registration Ack.
Lookup service
stores service-object
& service-attributes
Request for service
Service-object
Service invocation
 
Figure 3.4: Message sequence diagram illustrating Jini‟s discovery-join-lookup process 
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3.4.1.3 UNIVERSAL PLUG AND PLAY (UPNP) 
Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) is a device-centric peer-to-peer technology 
developed by the UPnP Forum [65]. Microsoft Corporation played an important role 
in UPnP‟s development and it is considered as an extension to the Microsoft‟s Plug 
and Play technology; however it is more than just an extension.  The major objective 
of UPnP is to enable discovery, auto-configuration, management and control of 
devices in unmanaged and small computing environments, such as small office or 
home environments. UPnP achieves its goal through utilizing existing standards, such 
as web and TCP/IP technologies. For service/device discovery, it uses Simple Service 
Discovery Protocol (SSDP) [72]. As in Jini‟s discovery-join-lookup process, SSDP is 
used for both advertising the device‟s (service) presences to the other devices in the 
proximity/scope as well as discovering other peer devices. However, unlike SLP and 
Jini, UPnP does not require any central repository to store the service or device 
information and/or service-object. Further, in contrast to SLP and Jini, UPnP uses 
XML for all the communication and exchange of device‟s information among the two 
entities of UPnP network (i.e. Control Point and Device). Devices‟ profiles describing 
their capabilities and features are written in XML format. Interested readers can refer 
to [65] for details of the UPnP device architecture provided by UPnP forum. 
3.4.1.4 THE PROPOSED DEVICE REGISTRATION AND DISCOVERY MECHANISM 
When we analyze the previously described discovery schemes, it is noted that 
security has never been a major concern or major design goal of these technologies.  
For example, Jini uses non-encrypted Remote Method Invocation (Java RMI) for all 
the communication that makes it susceptible to eavesdropping. Additionally, when a 
client wants to create an association with the resource/service, as a part of this process 
the service-object is downloaded from the Jini lookup service and this introduces the 
overhead in the sense that small devices have scare resources, and also there is a 
security risk in that an adversary can register a bogus service containing malicious 
code as its service-object. 
Further, it is also noted that at very basic level, the architecture of these 
discovery protocols is similar; however each has some of its own assumptions and 
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features that make it feasible for implementing in particular scenarios or 
environments. For example, SLP and UPnP are targeted to IP based device 
environments, while Jini is not restricted to IP-based environments; however it 
requires JVM (Java Virtual Machine). UPnP utilizes XML technology for 
device/service registration and discovery, while it is not the case in SLP and Jini. In 
Jini, the client requires more processing capability as compared to UPnP and SLP due 
to the installed JVM and downloaded service-object. It is not a big deal for large 
devices, such as desktop computers or laptops; however it is still challenging for small 
resource-constrained devices.  Another reason that limits the widespread use of Jini is 
the lack of support for J2ME-based devices, because when Jini was introduced there 
was no support for RMI in J2ME; however it is supported now.  
In summary, to simplify the analysis, design and prototype implementation of 
the proposed framework to test our hypothesis, we decided to design our own 
registration and discovery mechanism. Our proposed discovery and registration 
system incorporates several similar features to the device discovery technologies 
discussed above along with some of its own unique features to make the registration 
and discovery process simple, easy to implement, independent of existing technologies, 
and confidentiality and integrity protected. For example, like UPnP we have used XML 
to describe the registration and discovery messages mechanism for the proposed system, 
however in a much simpler way than UPnP. The reason we use XML is that it is an 
advantage for any modern communication system due to its flexibility, programming 
language independence and portability characteristics. It is flexible enough that one can 
incorporate additional features in the system later on, if necessary, and it also 
significantly increases interoperability between systems. 
Further, unlike Jini, where devices look for a lookup service through 
multicasting a search request on the network, in the proposed system the co-location 
server advertises itself through multicasting. We choose this mechanism as 
transmitting data consumes more battery power as compared to receiving data, and the 
devices in ubiquitous computing environments are more battery-constrained as 
compared to the server or base station. In our proposed system, the registration 
process could be considered equivalent to Jini‟s discovery and join process, and the 
 - 48 - 
discovery process could be considered equivalent to Jini‟s lookup process. Also note 
that in our proposed mechanism, all the communication during registration and 
discovery process between several entities of the system is encrypted, which is 
described in section 3.5. 
 
<DeviceProfile> 
 <DeviceID></DeviceID> 
 <LDuration></LDuration> 
 <Keyword></Keyword> 
 <DeviceLocation></DeviceLocation> 
 <CommProtocol> 
  <ChannelName></ChannelName> 
  <Address></Address> 
 </CommProtocol> 
 <DeviceCap></DeviceCap> 
 <UserInput></UserInput> 
</DeviceProfile> 
Figure 3.5: XML-based device description template 
<!ELEMENT DeviceProfile 
 ( DeviceID, LDuration, Keyword, DeviceLocation?, CommProtocol+, 
DeviceCap, UserInput? ) > 
<!ELEMENT DeviceID ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT LDuration ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT Keyword ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENTDeviceLocation ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT CommProtocol ( ChannelName, Address ) > 
<!ELEMENT ChannelName ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT Address ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT DeviceCap ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT UserInput ( #PCDATA ) > 
Figure 3.6: DTD file for device description/profile 
There are several ways to write device descriptions, e.g. Composite 
Capability / Preference Profiles (CC/PP) [107],  However, for the purpose of 
simplicity, we preferred to describe our own device template. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 
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show the XML based device description template and its corresponding Document 
Type Definition (DTD) respectively, which in contrast to UPnP device template are 
simple to understand and implement. DTDs contain information about an XML 
document‟s structure.  For example, it holds information about what elements might 
be included in an XML document, what attributes these elements might have, and 
what might be the ordering of these elements, etc. It is not compulsory for every XML 
document to have its corresponding DTD; however it is good practice to use DTDs in 
order to ensure the conformity or validity of an XML document.  
Another way to define the structure of an XML document is XML Schemas 
[73], which are more effective than DTDs. For example, DTDs provide support for 
only text data type; while XML Schemas support a wide range of data types including 
custom data types, and are useful when dealing with XML documents containing 
letters and numbers or having some restrictions on the acceptable data for its 
elements/attributes. We are fully aware of the fact that XML Schemas are more 
powerful than DTDs;  however for the sake of simplicity we have used DTDs. 
Additionally, if required, it is now easy to convert DTDs into XML Schemas 
automatically using one of the several available DTD to XML Schema 
converters/utilities, such as [74].  
3.5 CO-LOCATION (COLOC) PROTOCOL 
The co-location (CoLoc) protocol is a core part of our system and one of our 
main contributions. It is designed to achieve our generality, usability and security 
goals. It provides the functionality of registration, discovery, and security association 
initiation and execution of the selected PoP protocol. For the sake of simplicity and 
clarity, we have divided the overall protocol into three parts: registration, discovery of 
intended pairable device, and the selection and execution of an appropriate protocol to 
demonstrate/authenticate the physical proximity. The selection process involves 
device capabilities, constraints on pairing schemes and/or user preferences. The 
detailed description of each of the parts can be found in subsequent sections preceded 
by the description of several notations used in describing the CoLoc protocol. 
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3.5.1  NOTATIONS 
CS: Co-location server 
A: Resource device 
B: Client device 
Process_i: Actions/processes performed at device i before sending or receiving a 
message. 
X  Y: Msg : A message Msg sent from X to Y over a communication channel. 
PKi: Public key of i. 
Ki: Private or secret key of i. 
SKi: Session key internally generated by i. 
PSK: Pairing session key. 
PSKij: Shared pairing session key for the parties i and j.  
CP: Credential password, shared among all the registered devices and co-location server. 
Enc(): Encryption function. 
Dec(): Decryption function. 
Enc(x)y: An encryption function that encrypts plaintext x using key y, which could be 
a public/private key or shared secret key. 
Dec(x)y: A decryption function that decrypts ciphertext x using key y, which could be 
a public/private key or shared secret key. 
MAC(x)y: A keyed message authentication function that is applied to x using key y. 
||: Concatenation operator 
3.5.2 BOOTSTRAPPING 
Bootstrapping in our system refers to the initialization and advertisement of 
the co-location server. During bootstrapping, the co-location server generates its 
public/private key pair (i.e. PKColoc and KColoc) and broadcasts its connectivity 
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information along with its public key. Then, devices discover the co-location server 
for registration and/or discovery tasks by listening to the broadcast messages. 
Alternatively, in certain scenarios, where this mechanism is not available or difficult 
to implement, a one-time demonstrative discovery of the co-location server can be 
performed, which has now become more common in the literature of device pairing. 
As described in chapter 2, in this approach the user is involved in identifying and 
obtaining the connectivity information of the resource or intended communicating 
partner through some manual effort. 
3.5.3  REGISTRATION AND DISCOVERY PART OF THE COLOC 
PROTOCOL 
Figure 3.7 shows the registration part of the CoLoc protocol. Once the system 
is bootstrapped and device A receives the public key PKColoc of the co-location server, 
it encrypts the device profile with an internally generated temporary session key SKA. 
Then it sends an encrypted message along with a message authentication code 
(MAC), and SKA encrypted with the co-location server‟s public key PKColoc to the 
server. The device profile contains the id of device A along with connectivity 
information and some keywords (user friendly names) to identify the device in the 
networked environment, capability information (such as camera, display, keypad, etc), 
lease duration and optionally device location information (such as Pevensey II, Room 
5c11, etc). Additionally, any constraints or user input/preferences are also injected in 
the DeviceProfile. The complete DTD, which is used for validating the protocol‟s 
message including device profile, query and co-location server‟s response for client‟s 
discovery request is given in Implementation chapter. However, a sample 
DeviceProfile is given in figure 3.8. 
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Process_CS: 
Generate public/private key pair: PKColoc, KColoc 
CS  A: ServerID,PKColoc 
Process_A: 
RegistryMsg:=Enc(DeviceProfileA)SKA|| Enc(SKA)PKColoc, 
MAC(RegistryMsg)SKA 
A  CS: RegistryMsg 
Process_CS: 
splits and Decrypt RegistryMsg to obtain SKA first, 
and then DeviceProfile. 
If(integrityChecked()), then 
(a) Generate: PSKA 
(b) Register Device 
(c) ResponseMsg:= Success || PSKA || CP 
Else 
(a) ResponseMsg:= Abort/Fail 
End If 
RegAck:= Enc(ResponseMsg)SKA 
Destroy session key: SKA 
CS  A: RegAck 
Process_A: 
Dec(RegAck)SKA to obtain PSKA 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Registration part of the CoLoc protocol 
 
 
<DeviceProfile> 
<DeviceID>wiston</DeviceID> 
<LDuration>4</LDuration> 
<Keyword>Desktop PC;Computer</Keyword> 
<DeviceLocation>Netlab;Room 5C11</DeviceLocation> 
<CommProtocol> 
<ChannelName>Bluetooth</ChannelName> 
<Address>000A3A7E4CA2</Address> 
</CommProtocol> 
<CommProtocol> 
<ChannelName>TCP-IP</ChannelName> 
<Address>192.168.0.2:8009</Address> 
</CommProtocol> 
<DeviceCap>Display;Keypad;Button;Speaker;LED</DeviceCap> 
</DeviceProfile> 
 
Figure 3.8: A sample device profile 
 - 53 - 
The co-location server splits and decrypts the registration message in order to 
obtain the SKA first, which is then used to obtain the device profile. The co-location 
server also performs integrity check before registering the device. In response to a 
registration request, the co-location server sends an acknowledgement message to the 
device A, containing a one-time pairing session key PSKA and credential password CP 
encrypted with temporary session key SKA. Credential password CP is used in 
revocation mechanism, which is described in detail in section 3.7.2. The registration 
process applies to every device intended to become part of the deployed ubiquitous 
system. Once registration is done, device A will be visible to the other devices (i.e. 
clients) through the querying co-location server.  
 
 
Process_B: 
DiscoveryReq:=Enc(Query)SKB || Enc(SKB)PKColoc, 
MAC(DiscoveryReq)SKB 
B  CS: DiscoveryReq 
Process_CS: 
Split and Decrypt DiscoveryReq to obtain SKB  first, 
and then Query. 
If(integrityChecked()), then 
(a) Generate ResultSet containing  matching 
devices‟ profiles and their corresponding 
pairing session keys along with expiry time. 
(b) DiscoveryRespMsg:= Enc(ResultSet)SKB 
Else 
(a) DiscoveryRespMsg:=Abort/Fail 
End If 
Destroy session key: SKB 
CS  B: DiscoveryRespMsg 
Process_B: 
Dec(DiscoveryRespMsg)SKB 
to obtain devices‟ information along with their 
pairing session key(s)  and their expiry time. 
 
Figure 3.9: Discovery part of the CoLoc protocol 
 
In the discovery process (figure 3.9), device B (client) encrypts a query with 
temporary session key SKB. Then, it encrypts SKB with PKColoc and sends it to the co-
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location server along with the encrypted query and MAC of the overall message. The 
co-location server decrypts the client message and also performs an integrity check 
before going through the match-making process based on the criteria given in the 
query. Query contains the user-friendly name (if known) or the type of device, any 
user preferences for pairing process and optionally the locations in which devices 
should be searched (if server domain is too broad). A sample query is shown in figure 
3.10. 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" ?> 
<ProtocolMsg> 
<Command>Discovery</Command> 
<XMLData> 
<Query>Keyword|Computer;Location|Room 5C11</Query> 
</XMLData> 
</ProtocolMsg> 
Figure 3.10: A sample query for device discovery 
As a consequence, the co-location server sends information on matching 
devices (referred to as a ResultSet hereafter in this thesis) to the client (i.e. device B) 
encrypted with SKB. ResultSet contains the profiles of found devices based on the 
criteria given in query along with their one-time pairing session keys (i.e. PSKi) and 
their expiry time. 
3.5.3.1 REGISTRATION RENEWAL, UPDATE AND DEVICE DE-REGISTRATION 
In the proposed system, the registered devices are capable of renewing or 
updating their registration. Renewal and update requests can be for 
updating/modifying the device‟s profile or device status (i.e. busy or available), and 
extension/renewal of the lease time and/or pairing session key. Explicit de-registration 
can be performed on the demand of the registered device by sending a de-registration 
request to the co-location server. The co-location server also performs implicit de-
registration when the device lease time expires to keep the registered devices‟ 
information up-to-date, and to maintain the device‟s directory. During the implicit de-
registration process, any device whose lease time expires is automatically de-
registered by the co-location server by deleting their entry from the directory.  
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3.5.4  SELECTION AND EXECUTION OF MUTUALLY AGREED 
SCHEME 
As shown in figure 3.11, during this phase the client sends a message, 
containing the name of the selected PoP protocol, to the resource to initiate the 
pairing process. Once the resource device receives that message, it starts generating 
PoP data that will be used to verify the physical proximity of the devices. PoP data 
could be generated in numerous ways based on the nature of agreed protocol. For 
example, many modern devices carry sensors for other purposes, which could be used 
to obtain the PoP data. Where sensors are not available or it is hard to obtain PoP data 
directly from sensors, then user could be involved to get the PoP data. Considering the 
nature and ways of demonstrating the physical proximity of devices, PoP protocols 
are classified into four categories. The first category belongs to those protocols, which 
require user involvement in only generating PoP data (such as Button-to-Button and 
Blink-to-Button). In that case, verification of PoP data is done internally by the 
system. The second category belongs to those schemes which require user 
involvement only in verification of PoP data (such as Display-Display and Blink-
Blink). In that case PoP data is generated either internally by the system or from 
attached sensors with the devices. The third category belongs to those schemes, which 
require the user to be involved in generating PoP data as well as in verifying that data 
(such as Capture and Show, which is described in chapter 4). The fourth category 
belongs to those schemes, which do not involve the user in the proof-of-proximity 
process at all, so we call them automatic pairing schemes. We have further described 
each of the implemented schemes in chapter 4.  
At the end of execution of this phase, if the physical proximity has been 
proved, the established session between both of the devices is considered to be secure. 
Then, it is possible to establish the long-term connections by using other well known 
cryptographic protocols/schemes [34].  
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Process_B: 
Execute an algorithm that seeks for the best possible 
available mutually supported schemes that could be 
used to authenticate/demonstrate physical proximity 
between the devices. 
Inv_PairingMsg:=Enc(SelectedProtocolName)PSKAB 
 
B  A: Inv_PairingMsg 
Process_B: 
Generate PoP data to verify the physical proximity based 
on the nature of agreed PoP protocol. 
Process_A: 
Dec(Inv_PairingMsg)PSKAB to retrieve the name of 
pairing scheme. 
Generate PoP data that will be used to verify the 
physical proximity between the devices. 
Resp_Msg:= ENC(Resp_InvPairingMsg)PSKAB 
 
A  B: Resp_Msg 
Process_B: 
DEC(Resp_Msg)PSKAB 
ProximityVerMsg:= ENC(PoP data)PSKAB 
 
B  A: ProximityVerMsg 
Process_A: 
DEC(ProximityVerMsg)PSKAB 
Perform demonstration of physical proximity 
based on the previously agreed PoP protocol. 
If( success) 
 pairingA = „Accepted‟ 
Else 
pairingA = „Rejected‟ 
End If 
ProximityVerResp:= ENC(pairingA)PSKAB 
Process_B: 
Perform demonstration of physical proximity 
based on the previously agreed PoP protocol in parallel 
to device A. 
If(success) 
 pairingB = „Accepted‟ 
Else 
pairingB = „Rejected‟ 
End If 
 
A  B: ProximityVerResp 
Process_B: 
DEC(ProximityVerResp)PSKAB  to obtain pairingA. 
Pairing is achieved/granted only when 
(pairingA= „Accepted‟ & pairingB = „Accepted‟) 
Otherwise B aborts the pairing process 
 
Figure 3.11: Secure association initiation and execution of PoP protocol 
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3.6  SELECTION OF POP PROTOCOL(S) 
As described earlier, once the device discovery operation completes, the 
subsequent phase is the selection and execution of the PoP protocol. To achieve the 
objective of selecting an appropriate PoP protocol, we have designed a protocol 
selection algorithm presented in figure 3.12. The input parameters of algorithm include 
client‟s own device profile, resource device profile and an XML-based PoP protocol 
specification and selection policy.  
 
A sample protocol specification and selection policy is shown in figure 3.13; 
however it‟s associated DTD is given appendix C.  
Input: 
- Client‟s own profile, 
- Resource‟s profile, 
- Protocol specification and selection policy 
 
Output: 
   RecommendedProtocol(s) based on the given input parameters 
 
Step 1:Cl_Profile:= Read client‟s own profile 
Step 2:Res_Profile:= Read resource‟s profile (i.e. received from Co-location server) 
Step 3:Cl_SupportedProtocols:=getProtocolList(Cl_Profile) 
Step 4:Res_SupportedProtocols:=getProtocolList(Res_Profile) 
Step 5:Comm_SupportedProtocols:=mutualProtocolList(Cl_SupportedProtocols, 
                                         Res_SupportedProtocols) 
Step 6:RecommendedProtocols:=getBestProtocols(Comm_SupportedProtocols,  
               Cl_Constraints/Preference, Res_Constraints/Preferences) 
Step 7: Return: RecommendedProtocols 
 
Figure 3.12: An algorithm to find out the best possible PoP protocol(s) based on given 
input parameters 
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" ?> 
 
<PSPolicy> 
<Protocol> 
 <Name>Button_to_Button</Name> 
 <Type>1</Type> 
 <ClCapabilities>Button</ClCapabilities> 
 <ResCapabilities>Button</ResCapabilities> 
 <ProximityLimit>100</ProximityLimit> 
 <UILevel>1</UILevel> 
 </Protocol> 
<Protocol> 
 <Name>Capture_And_Show</Name> 
 <Type>3</Type> 
 <ClCapabilities>Camera;Display</ClCapabilities> 
 <ResCapabilities>Display</ResCapabilities> 
 <ProximityLimit>200</ProximityLimit> 
 <UILevel>3</UILevel> 
</Protocol> 
<Protocol> 
 <Name>Display_Display</Name> 
 <Type>2</Type> 
 <ClCapabilities>Display</ClCapabilities> 
 <ResCapabilities>Display</ResCapabilities> 
 <ProximityLimit>100</ProximityLimit> 
 <UILevel>1</UILevel> 
</Protocol> 
<Protocol> 
 <Name>Display_Speaker</Name> 
 <Type>2</Type> 
 <ClCapabilities>Display</ClCapabilities> 
 <ResCapabilities>Speaker</ResCapabilities> 
 <ProximityLimit>100</ProximityLimit> 
 <UILevel>1</UILevel> 
</Protocol> 
</PSPolicy> 
 
Figure 3.13: A sample protocol specification and selection policy 
<Name> tag contains the name of the PoP protocol for which other tags 
describe the selection criteria. The value of <Type> tag represents one of the 
categories of PoP protocols, which are briefly described in previous section and other 
details of these categories is given in chapter 4. The values of <ClCapabilities> and 
<ResCapabilities> tags describe the required capabilities of client and resource 
devices for the execution of the protocol. The value of <ProximityLimit> tag 
represents the maximum distance between the pairing partners up to which the 
protocol can work or can achieve good results. The value of <ProximityLimit> is 
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given in centimeters. The value of <UILevel> represents the level of required user 
interaction. „1‟ represents the low or minimum level of user interaction and „3‟ 
represents the high or maximum level of user interaction. These values are obtained 
based on the classification of PoP protocols presented in Chapter 4. 
3.6.1  INTERNAL WORKING OF PROTOCOL SELECTION 
ALGORITHM 
The protocol selection algorithm is consisting of several rounds. Each round 
facilitates with the filtration process of PoP protocols. During each round those PoP 
protocols are discarded which does not meet the requirements of some particular 
constraint of that round. Ultimately in round-5, we obtain those PoP protocols, which 
fully satisfy the user preferences and other requirements of the scenario/situation in 
which pairing process is going to be occurred. We describe each round of the 
execution of PoP protocol selection algorithm as below: 
Round-1: (Input: client-device profile, resource-device profile, PoP protocols 
specification and selection policy) 
Filter/select PoP protocols based on required capabilities of client and 
resource devices (refer to figure 3.13, ClCapabilities and ResCapabilities). 
Round-2: (Input: selected PoP protocols from Round-1 and the PoP protocols 
specification and selection policy). 
 Select the PoP Protocols that are appropriate for working within the given 
distance. It is achieved through comparing and performing selection based on 
the value of ProximityLimit tag (figure 3.13) with the distance given/input by 
the user (figure 4.8). 
Round-3: (Input: selected PoP protocols from Round-2 and the PoP protocols 
specification and selection policy). 
Select PoP protocols based on the level of required user interaction during 
pairing process. It is achieved through comparing the value of UILevel tag 
(figure 3.13) with the user-interaction option as selected by the user (figure 
4.8). 
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Round-4: (Input: selected PoP protocols from Round-3 and PoP protocols 
specification and selection policy). 
Select PoP protocols based on the constraints/limitations of PoP protocols and 
user preferences. It is achieved through comparing the value of Constraints 
tag (refer to appendix C) with the given user preferences (figure 4.8). 
Round-5: (Input: selected PoP protocols from Round-4 and PoP protocols 
specification and selection policy). 
In this final round, the priority level/recommended order is assigned to each 
of the PoP protocols obtained from Round-5. The high-level description of the 
calculation process for priority-level is described below. Note that the 
scores/points used in these calculations are only for demonstration and proof-
of-concept purposes. 
 
PoP protocol points calculation process from security point of view: 
If(fatal errors are not applicable to PoP protocol) 
FatalErrorPoints = 4;   
Else 
FatalErrorPoints = 2; 
  EndIf 
If(safe errors are not applicable to PoP protocol) 
SafeErrorPoints = 2; 
Else 
SafeErrorPoints = 1; 
  EndIf 
Note that the points for fatal errors and safe errors differ from each other due 
to the fact that fatal errors are more dangerous and serious than safe errors. 
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PoP protocol points calculation process from execution-time point of 
view: 
If (ProtocolExeuctionTime <= 15 seconds) 
ExecutionTimePoints = 5; 
ElseIf (ProtocolExeuctionTime > 15 seconds and <= 30 seconds) 
ExecutionTimePoints = 4; 
ElseIf (ProtocolExeuctionTime > 30 seconds and <= 45 seconds) 
ExecutionTimePoints = 3; 
ElseIf (ProtocolExeuctionTime > 45 seconds and <= 60 seconds) 
ExecutionTimePoints = 2; 
ElseIf (ProtocolExeuctionTime > 60 seconds and <= 75 seconds) 
ExecutionTimePoints = 1; 
Else 
ExecutionTimePoints = 0; 
EndIf 
 
Based on the above mentioned points calculation process, the level of priority 
is calculated, which eventually sets the recommended order of the PoP 
protocols. Rule is that the PoP protocol that has highest score/points will the 
best protocol for a given scenario/situation. 
 
3.7 MESSAGE SEQUENCE DIAGRAM 
In order to summarize the work presented so far, in figure 3.14, we have 
presented the message sequence diagram of the overall system. 
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Resource Device Co-location Server Client Device
Advertise server_info.
Advertise server_info.
Save server_info.
Save server_info.
Registration_ack.
Registration_request
Device registered
Device discovery_request
Discovery_response
Prepare disc_response_msg
Save disc_resp.
Execute PoP protocol selection
algorithm to obtain the best
possible protocol to demonstrate
the physical proximity
Invoke PoP_protocol_request
Response for invoke PoP_protocol_request
Generate PoP dataGenerate PoP data as required by the agreed protocol
PoP_data for verification and demonstraion of physical proximity
Perform demonstration of physical proximity
Proximity verification_response
Perform demonstration 
of physical proximity
 
Figure 3.14: Message sequence diagram of the system 
3.8 EXTENDED FEATURES OF THE SYSTEM 
Initially, we implemented the core system as described in previous sections 
and shown in figure 3.14. Once the core system was complete, we developed other 
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important features as part of it. Since these advanced features are added as an 
incremental step, we refer them as the extended features of the proposed system. The 
inclusion of these features in incremental fashion demonstrates that the proposed 
system has the potential to be extended without changing its core design.  
3.8.1 LONG-TERM DEVICE PAIRING 
As stated earlier, once a secure session is established between the intended 
communicating partners, a long term pairing can easily be established through the use 
of some standard cryptographic protocol [34]; however there is a need to manage and 
maintain these pairings, and to facilitate the users in securely reconnecting previously 
paired devices without going through the discovery and the proof-of-proximity phases 
again. The issue of managing long-term pairings – including un-pairing and 
revocation mechanisms – is an important aspect of secure device pairing; however, it 
is not given much attention in most of the recently proposed solutions to device 
pairing. We realized the importance of this aspect and extended the device component 
of the core framework through the inclusion of the device pairing repository (DPR) 
software component. DPR works in association with the secure association initiation 
and proof of proximity components. As the directory component in the co-location 
server stores the profile information of the devices, the DPR component stores the 
information about successfully created pairings for future use. The core responsibility 
of the DPR component is to facilitate with storing, retrieving, modifying, updating 
and deleting the information relating to successfully established pairings.  
The DTD for a DPR entry is shown in figure 3.15. Each DPR entry consists 
of several pieces of information, which include a user-friendly name for the 
successfully created pairing, its life time, device id, connectivity information for the 
paired device, and the information required for setting up a secure connection in the 
future (i.e. the type of algorithm, key-length, the actual key, and the credential 
password). 
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<!ELEMENT DevicePairing ( PairingName, PairingExpiry, DeviceID, CommProtocol, SecurityData ) >
<!ELEMENT PairingName ( #PCDATA ) >
<!ELEMENT PairingExpiry ( #PCDATA ) >
<!ELEMENT DeviceID ( #PCDATA ) >
<!ELEMENT CommProtocol ( ChannelName, Address ) >
<!ELEMENT ChannelName ( #PCDATA ) >
<!ELEMENT Address ( #PCDATA ) >
<!ELEMENT SecurityData ( Type, Key, CP ) >
<!ELEMENT Type ( #PCDATA ) >
<!ELEMENT Key ( #PCDATA ) >
<!ELEMENT CP ( #PCDATA ) >
 
Figure 3.15: The DTD for a device pairing repository (DPR) entry 
3.8.2 DEVICE UN-PAIRING AND REVOCATION MECHANISM 
We have classified the un-pairing as either explicit self un-pairing or selective 
on demand un-pairing. In the case of explicit self un-pairing, the DPR component 
provides the interface to the user/device owner for deleting either a particular or all of 
the previously created and stored pairing(s). The deletion process removes the pairing 
entry from the device pairing repository and thus causes the device to forget all the 
security relevant information for any previously established pairing(s). The advantage 
of this self un-pairing mechanism is twofold: firstly, if the device owner wants to sell 
the device, he/she can explicitly deletes all the required existing pairings before 
handing it to the new device owner. Secondly, if the client device is stolen or 
compromised, this mechanism allows the resource device to un-pair itself from client, 
thus avoiding any possible threats, such as keeping the resource busy in order to 
launch a DoS attack. Similarly, if the resource device is compromised, this mechanism 
allows the client device to un-pair itself from the resource (compromised) device. 
In the case of selective on demand un-pairing, the client device connects to 
the resource device in a secure mode and sends it an un-pairing request. As a 
consequence, the resource deletes all the stored pairing information for the current 
pairing and sends back an acknowledgement message to the client device. Due to the 
nature of this scheme, it can also be described as mutual un-pairing. Additionally, the 
DPR component also performs the implicit un-pairing whereby a pairing is deleted 
automatically when it expires. 
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The revocation is given less attention in the literature of device pairing, 
however we believe that it is an important issue that needs to be addressed when 
proposing or designing a system that provide secure device pairing. For example, in 
the case of a paired device theft, loss or compromise, it is necessary that all the other 
registered devices must be informed in a timely fashion in order to revoke the 
credentials assigned to that device. The straight forward solution to this problem is the 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) scheme [32]. However, this solution is practically 
infeasible for ubiquitous computing environments due to the fact that ubiquitous 
computing systems are ad hoc and dynamic in nature, most of the ubiquitous devices 
are small and resource constrained, and users of these systems are often non-technical. 
Considering these facts, the proposed system incorporates a simple revocation 
mechanism, which is based on a credential password (CP) generated by the co-
location server and shared among all the registered devices including the co-location 
server. Once a pairing is established, when two devices need to connect with each 
other, they must demonstrate possession of the CP first. When any registered device is 
found to be compromised or stolen, the user provides the details of that device to co-
location server through its interface in revoke mode. Then, the co-location server re-
generates the CP and broadcasts it along with the device id or friendly name of the 
compromised device to all registered devices in encrypted mode using their pairing 
session keys (PSKs), excluding the compromised or stolen device. This way, the 
devices, which are recipients of the co-location server‟s revocation message, revoke 
the credentials assigned to the compromised device and also delete any already 
established pairing with it. Consequently, when the compromised or stolen device 
tries to connect and benefit from any of the legitimate devices, its connection is 
refused due to the lack of credentials as well as its inability to show possession of the 
updated/modified CP. 
3.8.3 SECURE GROUP PAIRING 
In addition to long-term device pairing, the proposed system is also capable of 
establishing secure group communication. Figure 3.16 illustrates the group pairing 
protocol of the proposed system. In order to describe this protocol, we are following 
the same notations as outlined in section 3.5.1. Two additional notations used in this 
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protocol are GC (group controller) and M (group member). The group pairing process 
starts with the registration process, where all the intended members of the group are 
required to register with the co-location server. Then, a group controller (GC) queries 
the co-location server to obtain the list of intended group member devices along with 
their capabilities and connectivity information. The GC establishes a secure session 
with each of the group members through the execution of one of the PoP protocols 
followed by either sharing the group key Kgroup or group key material. Once the group 
key Kgroup or group key material has been shared between the entire group they can 
establish and maintain secure group communication either through our simplest 
scheme, standard cryptographic schemes[33, 34], or using more advanced schemes 
and their variations available in the literature, such as  [75-79].  
 
Process_GC:
DiscoveryReq:= Enc(Query)SKGC || Enc(SKGC)PKColoc,
                              MAC(DiscoveryReq)SKGC
GCCS: DiscoveryReq
Process_CS:
Detach and Decrypt DiscoveryReq to obtain SKGC  first,
and then Query.
If(integrityChecked()), then
     (a)  Generate ResultSet containing  matching
          devices‟ profiles and their corresponding
          pairing session keys along with expiry time.
     (b)  DiscoveryRespMsg:= Enc(ResultSet)SKGC
Else
     (a)  DiscoveryRespMsg:=Abort/Fail
End If
Destroy session key: SKGC
CSGC: DiscoveryRespMsg
Process_GC:
Dec(DiscoveryRespMsg)SKGC
to obtain devices‟ information  of the intended group
members along with their pairing session key(s)
and their expiry time.
Perform PoP phase with each of the intended group 
member as described in CoLoc protocol in order to create 
secure session with each of the group member and to share 
the group key Kgroup or group key material
GC M1,M2,…,Mn
 
Figure 3.16: Secure group pairing protocol 
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In our proposed scheme, when a new group member joins the group, it has to 
pair with GC first in order to obtain the shared group key Kgroup. The shared group key 
Kgroup is refreshed and re-distributed by the GC whenever an existing group member 
leaves the group, a new member joins the group, or a device compromise is detected 
to maintain the security of the group communication. This mechanism prohibits a 
former group member from accessing any on-going communication between the 
current group members and also prevents a new member from accessing and 
understanding any previously happened communication among the group members. 
3.9 SUMMARY 
The main goal of this research is to design a generic system that facilitates 
association of two co-located devices by demonstration of physical proximity in 
ubiquitous computing environments. To achieve this goal, we propose to integrate a 
discovery mechanism and a number of pairing scheme (called proof-of-proximity 
schemes in this dissertation) into a single system. The focus in this chapter was on the 
architectural view of the proposed system along with the design goals (i.e. generality, 
security, and usability), requirements and assumptions. A core part of the proposed 
framework is a novel protocol (CoLoc protocol), which provides the functionality of 
registration, discovery, and security association initiation and execution of the 
selected PoP protocol.  We described the details of the CoLoc protocol along with the 
PoP protocol selection mechanism. Finally, we also showed that the proposed system 
has potential to be extended without changing its core design through the addition of 
extra features without substantial effort. In next chapter, we shall discuss the 
prototype implementation of the proposed system. 
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CHAPTER 4  
IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
 
The focus of this chapter is the prototype implementation of the proposed 
system. In this chapter, we describe the software components of the proposed 
system, the structure of the CoLoc protocol messages, classification and 
description of the integrated PoP protocols followed by a demonstration of the 
prototype implementation. 
 
4.1 IMPLEMENTATION 
To evaluate our hypothesis and the proposed system, we built a prototype 
implementation of the system and conducted a usability study. The focus of this 
section is the implementation of the CoLoc protocol along with several integrated PoP 
protocols preceded by describing the software components of the proposed system. 
The details of usability study are described in chapter 5. 
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4.1.1 SOFTWARE COMPONENTS OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
We have implemented the prototype of the proposed system using Java 
(version 1.6) and Windows XP operating system. In the coding and implementation 
process, we have used Eclipse Galileo (version 3.5) as a Java IDE. Additionally, we 
have also used two PhidgetInterfaceKits [80] and a camera, which are requirement for 
some of the PoP protocols. The software components of the proposed system are 
implemented as Java packages, which are described in subsequent sections. Figure 4.1 
illustrates the relationship between the software components for the server 
application, while the relationship between these components on the device 
application is shown in figure 4.2. 
rad
security comm directory
 
Figure 4.1: Illustrating the relationship between the software components for the 
server application 
rad
security
comm
ps
sai
pop
dpr
 
Figure 4.2: Illustrating the relationship between the software components for the 
device application 
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4.1.1.1 COMMUNICATION (COMM) 
The communication component provides several wrapper APIs to facilitate 
the establishment of a communication channel between any two entities of the system. 
It also provides APIs for the broadcast or multicast of co-location server adverts and 
also provides communication APIs for the devices to discover the co-location server 
in order to perform subsequent registration and/or discovery operations.  
4.1.1.2 REGISTRATION AND DISCOVERY (RAD) 
The Registration and discovery component provides a set of APIs for the 
purpose of registration and discovery of resource devices. Some of the APIs provided 
by this component also utilize the APIs of communication component in order to 
exchange the registration and discovery messages between the two entities of the 
system.  
4.1.1.3 DIRECTORY 
The directory component of the system provides the functionality of registry. 
It keeps a record of all the registered devices. It provides APIs to access, read, write 
and update the directory information. In order to select a database package that suits 
our needs and can easily be integrated in the prototype implementation of the system, 
we surveyed several light-weight database packages, such as SQLLite [81], HSQLDB 
[82], Perst/PerstLite [83] and Berkeley DBXML [84], and finally decided to use  
Berkeley DBXML [84, 85] to maintain and keep record of the devices‟ profiles. The 
brief description of each of the mentioned database packages is given below followed 
by describing the reasons to choose Berkeley DBXML. 
 SQLITE: SQLite is an embedded light-weight database management 
system suitable for implementing in server-less scenarios.  It is developed 
in the C programming language and source code is in the public domain 
[81]. It implements a database engine, which is self-contained, does not 
require any configurations and supports many features of SQL (structured 
query language). Since it stores complete database including all of its 
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tables into a single file, it is suitable for implementing in systems that 
require zero configuration. Some of the limitations of SQLite include lack 
of support for writing to views, partial support for triggers and limited 
support for complex queries, for instance, it does not allow changing or 
removing columns using Alter Table statement [81]. 
 HSQLDB: HSQLDB stands for Hyper Structured Query Language 
Database. It is an open source RDBMS (relational database management 
system), which is developed in Java and  available under a BSD (Berkeley 
Software Distribution)  license [82]. Like SQLite, it also offers a light-
weight database engine, which facilitates both disk-based and in-memory 
tables. Additionally, it supports both server-less as well as server-based 
modes of operation. 
 PERST/PERSTLITE: Perst is an open source object-oriented database 
management system (ODBMS), officially released by McObject on 
February 6, 2006. It is available in two implementations: Java and C#.  It is 
an embedded light-weight database system, which leverages the object 
oriented nature of Java and C#. It enables developers to store/retrieve 
objects directly and could be included inside an application that needs its 
own data storage. PerstLite is an implementation of Perst for J2ME [83]. 
 BERKELEY DBXML:  Originally Sleepycat Software developed Berkeley 
DBXML, which was later on acquired by Oracle and now known as Oracle 
Berkeley DBXML. It is an embeddable open source XML database 
package specifically designed for storing and retrieving XML documents. 
Berkeley DBXML is written in C++, APIs for Berkeley DBXML exist for 
Java, C/C++, Python, TCL and Perl [84].  
Berkeley DBXML is extended from and built on top of Berkeley DB 
(BDB) [86]. BDB is originated from University of California, Berkeley, 
and is known as a “key-value” database package. It facilitates data storage 
in the form of arbitrary key-value pairs as byte arrays with the support of 
multiple data items for a single key. Since Berkeley DBXML is extended 
from BDB, it incorporates all potential features of BDB, such as zero-
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configuration and zero-human administration. However, unlike BDB, and 
relational databases that store data in relational tables, Berkeley DBXML 
is designed to store arbitrary trees of XML data. It provides efficient and 
fast data retrieval, because it has an  XQuery engine, an XML indexer and 
a parser on top of BDB [87]. In Berkeley DBXML, documents are stored 
in containers either as a complete document or as nodes. The containers 
that store complete XML document without any changes or alterations are 
known as Wholedoc containers, while those containers that store XML 
document as nodes are known as node containers. The default type is node 
container.  
In summary, Berkeley DBXML provides such features and benefits that make 
it an ideal package to use in the implementation of the proposed system. For example, 
in our proposed system the overall communication between several entities of the 
system is in XML form, even devices use XML documents to register their 
capabilities. The other benefits of Berkeley DBXML includes fast XML data storage 
and retrieval, support for W3C standard XQuery and XPath, eliminating the need for 
a DBA, and the capability for unattended and continuous operation (i.e. zero 
administration). Also from development and programming point of views, Berkely 
DBXML is flexible and easy to deploy, eliminate the need to convert XML into other 
data structures and supports a wide range of programming languages and operating 
system platforms [84]. 
4.1.1.4 PROTOCOL SELECTION (PS) 
The protocol selection component provides APIs to find the best possible PoP 
protocol(s) based on the devices‟ profiles, user-preferences and a selection criterion 
defined in an XML-based PoP protocol specification and selection policy file, which 
is already described in chapter 3 (section 3.6). 
4.1.1.5 SECURE ASSOCIATION INITIATION (SAI) 
The Secure association initiation component utilizes the APIs from protocol 
selection, communication, security and proof-of-proximity components in order to 
find, negotiate and initiate the execution of the selected PoP protocol. 
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4.1.1.6 PROOF OF PROXIMITY (POP) 
The Proof of proximity component is responsible for providing APIs for the 
execution of the selected PoP protocol in order to prove the physical proximity 
between devices.  
4.1.1.7 SECURITY 
Since the system needs to perform several cryptographic operations, such as 
encryption/decryption and calculating hashes, the security component facilitates with 
these cryptographic functions. 
4.1.1.8 DEVICE PAIRING REPOSITORY (DPR) 
DPR works in association with the secure association initiation and proof of 
proximity components. As the directory component in the co-location server 
facilitates with the device registry, the DPR component stores the information about 
successfully created pairings for future use. The core responsibility of the DPR 
component is to facilitate with storing, retrieving, modifying, updating and deleting 
the information relating to successfully established pairings. 
4.1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE COLOC PROTOCOL MESSAGES 
The DTD to validate the CoLoc protocol messages is shown in figure 4.3. 
This DTD describes the structure of CoLoc protocol messages and is used to validate 
all the XML-based communication in the system during registration, discovery and 
proof-of-proximity phases, such as device profiles, discovery queries, and co-location 
server‟s reply to client in response of discovery request. 
Every Coloc protocol message contains a „Command‟ tag and at most one 
„XMLData‟ tag. The command tag defines the type of message or protocol 
instruction, while the XMLData tag defines several other sub-tags, but only one can 
be used in any given message. For example, XMLData tag contains a „DeviceProfile‟ 
sub-tag to define the device profile during registration, and a „Query‟ sub-tag to 
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define the client‟s query during the discovery phase (refer to figure 3.10). 
„DeviceList‟ tag defines the list of found devices as a result of client‟s query. The 
DeviceID tag is used when a resource device performs explicit de-registration with 
the co-location server or request for a renewal of registration or pairing session key. 
The PSK tag defines the pairing session key and is used during the registration or the 
renewal of registration of the resource device, while CP tag defines the credential 
password that is used in providing credential revocation mechanism (see section 
3.7.2). PoPProtocol and PoPData are used during the proof of proximity phase, which 
define PoP protocol name and PoP data respectively. A CoLoc message that illustrates 
the device‟s explicit deregistration request is given in figure 4.4. 
 
 
<!-- This DTD validates protocol messages/commands --> 
<!ELEMENTProtocolMsg ( Command, XMLData? ) > 
<!ELEMENT Command ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT XMLData ( DeviceProfile | Query | DeviceList | DeviceID | PoPProtocol | PoPData| PSK| CP) > 
<!ELEMENTDeviceProfile ( DeviceID, LDuration, Keyword, DeviceLocation?, CommProtocol+, DeviceCap, UserInput? ) > 
<!ELEMENT Query ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT DeviceList ( DeviceInfo+ ) > 
<!ELEMENTDeviceInfo ( PSK, ExpiryTime, DeviceID, DeviceLocation?, CommProtocol+, DeviceCap, UserInput? ) > 
<!ELEMENT ExpiryTime ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT PSK ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT DeviceID ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT LDuration ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT Keyword ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT DeviceLocation ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT CommProtocol ( ChannelName, Address ) > 
<!ELEMENT ChannelName ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT Address ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT DeviceCap ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT UserInput ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT PoPProtocol ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT PoPData ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT CP ( #PCDATA ) > 
 
Figure 4.3: DTD to validate the messages of CoLoc protocol 
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1" ?> 
<ProtocolMsg> 
<Command>DeRegister</Command> 
<XMLData> 
<DeviceID>Wiston</DeviceID> 
</XMLData> 
</ProtocolMsg> 
Figure 4.4: A Coloc protocol message illustrating the device‟s 
explicit deregistration request 
4.2 CLASSIFICATION OF THE IMPLEMENTED POP 
PROTOCOLS 
In this section, we present the details of the PoP protocols, which are 
integrated in the prototype implementation of the proposed system in order to 
demonstrate the physical proximity of the devices. The fourteen integrated PoP 
protocols are classified into three categories (referred as category-1, category-2 and 
category-3 protocols hereafter in this dissertation) distinguishing user action(s) in the 
generation of PoP data and user involvement in verifying/matching PoP data. Those 
PoP protocols, which require some user action(s) in the generation of PoP data 
belongs to the category-1, the category-2 is composed of those PoP protocols, which 
involve user in the verification/matching of PoP data, and the category-3 contains 
those PoP protocols, which require user to be involved in both the generation and the 
verification of PoP data. The category-wise brief description of each of the 
implemented PoP protocol is presented below. 
4.2.1 CATEGORY-1 POP PROTOCOLS 
4.2.1.1 BUTTON-TO-BUTTON (B-TO-B) 
This protocol is originally introduced by Soriente et al. in BEDA [12]. This 
scheme requires that both of the devices must have at least a single button. The main 
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idea is that the user simultaneously presses a button on both of the devices. The time-
interval between button presses is then utilized to generate 15-bits PoP data on each 
of the device. In our system implementation, the ENTER key of the keyboard is 
programmed to serve the purpose of a single button. 
4.2.1.2 BLINK-TO-BUTTON (BLINK-TO-B) 
This scheme is a variant of Display-to-Button (D-to-B), originally introduced 
in BEDA [12]. This scheme requires that at least one of the devices have a single 
button and the other an LED (light emitting diode). The main idea is that the user 
presses a button on the first device in synchronization with blinking pattern of an LED 
on the other device. Actually, the first device selects a short secret and encodes it into 
several time-intervals and transmits it through the LED-blinks by inserting these time-
intervals between the blinking patterns. Then, on the other device, time-intervals 
between button presses is utilized to generate the same secret key. 
4.2.1.3 BEEP-TO-BUTTON (BEEP-TO-B) 
This scheme is a variant of the Blink-to-Button scheme. The only difference 
is that instead of an LED, one of the devices requires a speaker or beeper and the 
other a single button. In this scheme, the user presses a button on the first device in 
synchronization with beeps generated by the other device.  
4.2.1.4 SEEING IS BELIEVING (SiB) 
This scheme is originally introduced by McCune et al. [29] and the detailed 
description of this scheme has already been given in chapter 2. As in [88], we have 
not implemented this scheme in its entirety. Instead, for the sake of testing usability, 
we have followed the simplified method mentioned in [88]. The idea described in [88] 
is that the user takes photo of a bar-code that will be stored in the client device and 
later on manually processed by the test administrator. 
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4.2.2 CATEGORY-2 POP PROTOCOLS 
As described earlier, in these schemes, the system generates PoP data 
internally through the use of cryptographic functions and then the user is responsible 
for verifying that both of the devices possess the same PoP data. For those schemes 
that require synchronization, we again follow the method of [88]. According to that 
method, synchronization is achieved with the help of the user by pressing a single 
button (i.e. the ENTER key in our case) on both of the devices simultaneously.  
4.2.2.1 BLINK-BLINK 
The verification process starts when the user presses an ENTER key on both of 
the devices simultaneously. Then, both of the devices encode the PoP data into blinking 
patterns and transmit it. The user is then responsible for observing the blinking patterns 
emitting from both of the devices and accepting or rejecting pairing based on his/her 
observation.  
4.2.2.2 BLINK-BEEP 
Blink-Beep is same as Blink-Blink except that one device encodes and 
transmits PoP Data into blinking patterns; while the other uses speakers/beeper to 
transmit beeps in synchronization with LED blinks on the first device. As in Blink-
Blink, the user is then responsible for observing the blinking patterns emitting from 
one device and beeps from the other device, and accepting or rejecting pairing based 
on his/her observation.  
4.2.2.3 BEEP-BEEP 
Again it is same as Blink-Blink. Here the only difference is that a 
speaker/beeper is required in both of the devices and PoP data is encoded and 
transmitted through the beep sounds. The user is again responsible for observing that 
the beep sounds are generated in synchronization from both the devices, and accepting 
or rejecting pairing based on his/her observation.  
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4.2.2.4 DISPLAY-DISPLAY 
This scheme is originally introduced by Goodrich et al. in Loud and Clear 
[31]. We have used the same dictionary to generate the MadLib sentences (i.e. 
sentences that are non-sensical, but syntactically or grammatically correct) used in the 
variant we have implemented. The main idea of this scheme is that it encodes PoP 
data into a MadLib sentence and displays it on the screen of both of the devices. Then 
the user is responsible for comparing the two MadLib sentences shown on the screens 
of both of the devices, and accepting or rejecting the pairing based on his/her 
observation. 
4.2.2.5 DISPLAY-SPEAKER 
In this variant PoP data is encoded into a MadLib sentence. One of the 
devices shows it on its screen; while the other vocalizes it. Then the user is 
responsible for comparing the vocalized MadLib sentence with the one shown on the 
screens of other device, and accepting or rejecting the pairing based on his/her 
observation. 
4.2.2.6 SPEAKER-SPEAKER 
This is the same as the Display-Display, the only difference is that both of the 
devices require speakers. Thus, instead of showing Madlib sentences on screen, both 
of the devices vocalize them. Then the user is responsible for comparing the vocalized 
Madlib sentences from both of the devices, and accepting or rejecting pairing based 
on his/her observation. 
4.2.2.7 DIGITS COMPARISON 
It is very similar to Display-Display scheme, the only difference is that 
instead of comparing Madlib sentences, a number is compared, which is shown on the 
screens of both of the devices. The user is then responsible for accepting or rejecting 
pairing based on his/her observation. Unlike Display-Display, this scheme is more 
suitable for devices that have limited/small displays. 
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4.2.2.8 HASH COMPARISON 
It is similar to Display-Display scheme. However instead of encoding PoP 
data into a MadLib sentence, it is encoded into a hash value that is displayed on the 
screens of both of the devices. Then the user is responsible for comparing the two 
hashes shown on the screens of both of the devices and accepting or rejecting the 
pairing based on his/her observation. 
4.2.3 CATEGORY-3 POP PROTOCOLS 
4.2.3.1 SELECTIVE IMAGE COMPARISON (SIC) 
In this scheme, the user selects an image that is transmitted as PoP data and 
shown on the screen of both of the devices. The user is then responsible for 
comparing the image shown on the screens of both of the devices, and accepting or 
rejecting the pairing based on his/her observation.  
4.2.3.2 CAPTURE AND SHOW (CAS) 
In this method, the user is fully involved in the pairing process. This method 
requires that at least one of the devices has a Camera. The user takes a snap-shot of 
something, such as any object or scene, near to him. The system shows the captured 
image on the screens of both of the devices. Then the user is responsible for accepting 
or rejecting the pairing based on his/her observation.  
4.2.4 AUTOMATIC POP PROTOCOLS 
Table 4.1 presents the summary of the features of the implemented PoP 
protocols. However, apart from the previously discussed three categories of PoP 
protocols, we also envision an additional category of automatic PoP protocols. The 
automatic PoP protocols might not involve the user in the pairing process at all. These 
schemes will rely heavily on sensor technologies. In the context of our proposed 
system, these schemes will generate the PoP data from automatic, accurate and 
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reliable sensors, which will also verified automatically without involving users. 
Others have already started to explore these schemes. Although, they haven‟t 
developed fully automatic protocols yet, their proposed schemes require much less 
user interaction/involvement during the pairing process as compared to the previously 
discussed three categories of protocols. Examples of these schemes include [11, 14, 
16, 28], however these schemes are costly, and require exotic hardware and/or 
common interface on both of the devices, which is impractical in most of the device 
pairing scenarios in ubiquitous computing environments. 
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The Implemented PoP 
Protocol 
Device Capabilities Human/User involvement Out-of-
band/Location-
limited secondary 
channel 
 
Device A Device B 
Category-1: Users are involved in generating PoP data. 
Button-to-Button A single button on each of the 
device 
Press button on both of the 
devices simultaneously with 
random time-intervals until 
response signal received 
Tactile 
Blink-to-Button An LED A single button Press and release button on 
device B whenever the LED of 
device A flashes/blinks 
Visual and Tactile 
Beep-to-Button Speaker/Beeper A single button Press and release button on 
device B whenever the LED of 
device A flashes/blinks 
Audio and Tactile 
Seeing-is-Believing Display or   Bar 
code 
sticker/label 
Camera Properly place camera of device 
B at the displayed bar code on 
device A with sufficient proximity 
and take the photograph 
Visual 
Category-2: Users are involved in verifying the PoP data. 
Blink-Blink A single LED on each of the device Compare the two synchronous 
LED blinking patterns  
Visual 
Blink-Beep An LED Speaker Observe the synchronization of 
an LED blink with a beep 
generated from the other device 
Audio and Visual 
Beep-Beep Speaker Speaker Compare the two vocalized 
MadLib sentences from both of 
the devices 
Audio 
Display-Display Display Display Compare the two MadLib 
sentences displayed on both of 
the devices 
Visual 
Display-Speaker Display Speaker Compare the MadLib sentence 
displayed on the screen of device 
A with the vocalized MadLib 
sentence from device B 
Audio and Visual 
Speaker-Speaker Speaker Speaker Compare the two vocalized 
MadLib sentences from both of 
the devices 
Audio 
Digits Comparison Display Display Compare two numbers displayed 
on both of the devices 
Visual 
Hash Comparison Display Display Compare two hashes displayed 
on both of the devices 
Visual 
Category-3: Users are involved in both generating and verifying the PoP data. 
Selective Image 
Comparison 
Display Display Compare two images displayed 
on both of the devices 
Visual 
Capture and Show Display Display and 
Camera 
Take a photo of a nearby 
object/scene and compare it with 
the image displayed on the 
screens of both of the devices 
Visual 
Table 4.1: Features summary of the PoP Protocols 
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4.3 DEMONSTRATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION 
Figure 4.5(a) and 4.5(b) shows the screen shot of the user interface of the 
client and resource applications. We have designed simple user interfaces. In this 
section, we demonstrate the execution of the proposed system through the help of 
several screen shots. 
 
Figure 4.5(a): Client applications‟ GUI 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5(b): Resource applications‟ GUI 
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Once the co-location server bootstrap the system through broadcasting its 
public key and connectivity information, the user can find it by clicking the „Search 
for Coloc Server‟ menu item from the client or resource application. In order to 
register several devices in the system, we have simulated different kinds of devices 
(i.e. printers, laptops, desktop computers, mobile phones) through creating their 
XML-based device profiles and stored them locally. Then each device is registered 
with the co-location server just by clicking the „Device Registration‟ menu item 
(figure 4.6) and then providing its XML-based device profile.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Screenshot of resource application illustrating the device registration step 
 
Figure 4.7: Screenshot of client application illustrating the device discovery step 
 - 84 - 
Once devices are registered with the co-location server, these can be 
discovered by the client application. A user can use any one of the pre-set discovery 
options (figure 4.7) or can use the „Advanced Pairing‟ menu item to perform an 
advanced device discovery and pairing (figure 4.8). In advanced pairing a user can 
establish a long-term pairing, optionally enter the user input/preference, location in 
which devices required to be searched and the approximate distance of the intended 
pair-able devices. The distance value entered by the user facilitates the PoP protocol 
selection process with filtration of those PoP protocols that does suit the required 
distance. During this process the user-entered distance will be compared with the 
distance as given in protocol specification and selection policy file for each of the PoP 
protocol. Also note that this is an approximate distance.  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Advanced pairing options 
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Based on the user‟s selection of the device-type (in this case printer), the 
client receives a list of the matching devices as illustrated in figure 4.9. User selects 
the intended device and clicks the „Next‟ button to proceed. When user clicks the next 
button, another list box appears on the screen containing the list of PoP protocols in 
recommended order (figure 4.10). Finally, the user selects the name of a PoP protocol 
and clicks the „Do Pairing‟, which initiates the process of demonstrating the physical 
proximity of devices through the chosen PoP protocol. 
 
Figure 4.9: Screenshot showing list of found devices 
 
Figure 4.10: Screenshot showing list of PoP protocols 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
The focus of this chapter was the prototype implementation of the framework. 
We described the software components of the proposed system and discussed the 
structure of the CoLoc protocol messages. We also presented details of the fourteen 
PoP protocols that are integrated in the prototype implementation of the proposed 
system. The implemented PoP protocols are classified into three categories 
distinguishing user actions in the generation of PoP data and user involvement in 
verifying/matching PoP data. Apart from the three categories of implemented PoP 
protocols, we also envisioned an additional category of automatic PoP protocols. The 
protocols belonging to the automatic category of PoP protocols might not involve the 
user in the pairing process, instead these might rely heavily on sensor technologies; 
however these schemes are costly, and require exotic hardware and/or common 
interface on both of the devices that make them impractical in most of the device 
pairing scenarios in ubiquitous computing environments. Finally, we presented the 
demonstration of the prototype implementation. In next chapter, we provide the 
details of a usability study that is carried out in pursuance of the hypothesis of the 
dissertation and to evaluate the proposed system.  
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CHAPTER 5  
EVALUATION 
 
 
 
The focus of this chapter is a usability study that is carried out in pursuance of 
the hypothesis of the dissertation and to evaluate the proposed system. The 
evaluation of the proposed system is presented through the analysis of the 
usability study results and its design features. At the end of this chapter, we 
also discuss the wider view of the usability study results in general and their 
impact on the PoP protocol selection criteria in particular followed by the 
chapter’s summary. 
 
5.1 USABILITY STUDY 
In order to evaluate the proposed system and to support our main argument 
that the integration of discovery mechanism and several proof-of-proximity protocols 
into a single device pairing system is an effective approach for ordinary users, we 
conducted a usability study. This is a study of the eight pairing schemes as well as the 
proposed system, which integrates them. The results of the usability study are useful 
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to test three hypothesis: 1) are the users good at identifying an appropriate (right) 
pairing scheme when they have to choose between large number of pairing schemes; 
2) To what extent users like to be involved in the pairing process;  and most 
importantly to evaluate the main hypothesis of the dissertation that 3) is the 
integration  of discovery mechanism and the pairing schemes into a single system an 
effective solution for ubiquitous computing environments from the user‟s point of 
view, and are they perceiving it as usable. Additionally, the results of the usability 
study also highlight some of the general aspects of device pairing schemes that are 
worth consideration when designing future solutions for device pairing. In this 
section, firstly we discuss the prior work on usability of device pairing schemes, then 
we describe the test apparatus and the test cases that are selected as part of this study 
followed by describing the demographic information of test‟s participants, test 
procedure, and the results. 
5.1.1 PRIOR WORK ON USABILITY OF DEVICE PAIRING SCHEMES 
More recently the usability issue of secure device pairing schemes has got 
significant attention from researchers and there exist some recent work on the 
usability of device pairing schemes in the literature. Below are described some of the 
notable work in this area. 
In the literature, Uzun et al. [89] are considered to be the first who performed the 
usability analysis of secure device pairing methods followed by [90, 91]. Uzun et al. 
[89] presented a comparative usability analysis of some of the conventional paring 
schemes. In their study, the participants were asked to compare strings displayed on 
mobile devices, copy a PIN displayed on one device and enter it onto another, and 
select a PIN from among 4 numeric values that matched a string displayed on another 
device. Their findings were that participant perceived copying and entering as booth 
secure and professional while comparing was perceived as easy to use. They 
recommended using a PIN of not more than 7 digits and that the user interface should 
be designed in such a way that the default option is the most secure. More recently, 
Kumar et al. [91] presented an experimental evaluation of a large set of device pairing 
schemes. Their [91] results showed that some simple schemes, such as number 
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comparison, were quite attractive overall in terms of speed, security and usability. 
Subsequently, in  [92] authors argued that the participants of prior study  [91] 
comprised of mostly young males (70%) and the test organizers were experts in 
security relevant research as well as developers of some of the tested pairing schemes. 
They argued that the results of the study  [91] were valuable, however  it required 
further experimentation (usability tests) with more diverse participants, and more 
diverse scenarios. Many of the tested pairing schemes in [92] overlapped with the 
already tested schemes in [91], however this study differed from [91] in that the focus 
of this study was on within subjects analysis.  The results of the study  [92]  were 
helpful in indentifying the pairing schemes, which were not feasible for some specific 
groups of users with regard to age, gender and prior experience with device pairing. 
More recently, Kainda et al. [93] also performed a usability and security evaluation of 
the pairing schemes. The main focus of this [93]  work was on comparison of the 
usability and the security of those pairing schemes, which used more recently 
proposed and identified out-of-band channels together with some of the conventional 
ones as presented in [89]. The four classes of pairing schemes that were covered in 
this study are: Comparing (compare and confirm), Selecting (compare and select), 
Entering (copy and enter), and Barcode (taking a picture of a barcode using a camera). 
This work differed from [89] in the sense that authors also took into account the 
scenarios where the compared strings were nearly similar (i.e. mismatched by only 
one or two digits, characters or words depending on the scheme). Our work is similar 
to  [93] in terms of the methodology used to carry out the usability study, however the 
selected pairing schemes in our study are different from those tested in [93].  
5.1.2 TEST APPARATUS 
We have setup the implemented system into two 1.9GHz Dell Machines each 
with 1GB RAM running the WindowsXP operating system. We have also used two 
PhidgetInterfaceKits [80]. We have used these kits to implement the blinking 
operation (i.e. LED blinking patterns), which is a requirement for two of the PoP 
protocols. Additionally, two of the implemented PoP protocols require a camera to 
capture the photo of barcode or some object/scene in the proximity. Since, there is not 
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a built-in camera with the PCs; we have used an external web-cam for the purpose of 
capturing photos. 
5.1.3 SELECTION OF TEST CASES 
We have selected eight PoP schemes for our experiment: three from the first 
category (section 4.2.1), three from the second category (section 4.2.2), and two from 
the third category (section 4.2.3).  
 
Figure 5.1: Participants response for the usability of 4-button based pairing schemes 
The reason for conducting the user study with a reduced number of PoP 
schemes rather than all fourteen implemented schemes is to avoid user fatigue. With 
all PoP schemes, a single experiment takes around an hour, which causes for 
unrealistic/unproductive data, especially for a few of the last test cases/tasks. 
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Therefore after a careful analysis, 6 pairing schemes are eliminated from this usability 
study. During elimination process, we considered the results of some of our previous 
experiments (3, section 1.3) conducted with 15 users and 4 button-based schemes, and 
also referred the prior work [89-93] on usability of device pairing schemes. For 
example some of those schemes, which produce/require synchronized audio/visual 
signal did not perform well in prior evaluations due to high error rate and user-
annoyance [9, 88], so we eliminated Beep-Beep and Speaker-Speaker and Blink-Beep. 
According to the results of our previous experiments (as shown in figure 5.1), the 
users perceived Beep-to-Button scheme as harder compared to the other three button-
based schemes, so we eliminated the Beep-to-Button scheme as well. Digits 
comparison is too simple approach and hash comparison is not such a user-friendly 
approach [93], so we preferred Display-Display over these two schemes.  
In summary, the following are the short-listed PoP protocols that we have 
selected for the usability study. 
 Category - 1  
Button-to-Button 
Blink-to-Button 
Seeing-is-Believing (SiB) 
 Category - 2  
Blink-Blink 
Display-Display 
Display-Speaker 
 Category - 3  
Selective Image Comparison (SiC) 
Capture and Show (CaS) 
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5.1.4 PARTICIPANTS 
It is widely accepted that any user study that is performed by 20 users captures 
over 98% of usability issues [94], so a total of 20 volunteers were recruited. The 
majority of the participants are students of the University of Sussex and most of them 
are proficient computer users. The background profile information of the participants is 
summarized in table 5.1. 
 
 
Gender 
Male 55% 
Female 45% 
Age 
18 - 25  40% 
26 - 40 40% 
41 or above 20% 
Education 
High School/College 15% 
Bachelor 40% 
Masters 35% 
Doctorate (PhD) 10% 
Pairing Experience 
Yes 90% 
No 10% 
Daily Computer Usage 
2 or less hours 15% 
3 - 5 hours 50% 
6 or above hours 35% 
Table 5.1: Test participant‟s demographic information 
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5.1.5 TEST PROCEDURE 
The tests were conducted in a lab-based environment. Before the start of each 
experiment, we explained briefly the goals of the experiment along with the 
description of each pairing method to the participant; however we had already 
provided a leaflet to each participant in either hardcopy or through email before the 
actual day of the experiment that contains all the details of the experiment.  Each 
participant filled a pre-test questionnaire before starting the test cases. The pre-test 
questionnaire was used to collect the demographic information of the participants. 
Each experiment consisted of two parts. In the first part, each participant 
performed the tasks of executing the eight PoP protocols, which are mentioned earlier 
in section 5.1.3. These eight protocols were programmed to work independently from 
the proposed system and do not include device registration and discovery phase. 
Every participant performed each of the tasks twice. The first execution of each of the 
tasks was without any attack, while the second execution was under an attack 
scenario, in which users had to identify the mismatches. From the data of the first 
execution of each user, safe errors (i.e. identifying a match as a mismatch) are 
identified, while second execution provides data for fatal errors (i.e. identifying a 
mismatch as a match). Note that for the pairing schemes in which user is involved in 
generating the PoP data, fatal errors are not applicable. Thus, in that case both of the 
executions were performed without the attack scenario. Timing information was also 
recorded and stored in the test log file along with the other data. At the end of first 
part, each participant was given an After Scenario Questionnaire-1 (ASQ-1) to record 
his/her satisfaction with the performed tasks. 
In the second part of the experiment, each participant performed two 
executions of the proposed implemented system, which is described in chapter 4 
(section 4.3). At the completion of this part of experiment, each participant is given an 
After Scenario Questionnaire-2 (ASQ-2) to record his/her satisfaction with the 
proposed implemented system, which is denoted as CoLoc in the results of the 
usability study. 
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Finally, at the end of overall experiment every participant also filled a post-
test questionnaire that contains two scenario-based questions and one question 
regarding the ranking of each category of pairing schemes. The pre-test questionnaire, 
ASQ-1, ASQ-2, and post-test questionnaire are given in appendix B.1 – B.4. 
5.1.6 RESULTS 
The usability study results are obtained from the collected data by means of 
questionnaires (i.e. two ASQs and one Post-Test questionnaire) as well as by the log 
files generated during the experiment. Two separate log files were created for each 
participant during the experiment; one for first phase of the experiment and the other 
for second phase of the experiment. The first log file recorded 16 lines of data and 
each line contained 7 data items. These include test date and time, pairing scheme 
name, completion duration in seconds, expected completion result, actual completion 
result, error information, and information about the successful completion of task. 
There are 20 participants, so we got 2240 data items in total from first set of log files. 
The second log file recorded 2 lines of data and each line contained 8 data items, so 
we got 320 data items in total from the second set of log files. The seven data items 
are similar as in first log file and the eighth data item records information about the 
user input/preference. Further, we got 35 data items from the three questionnaires for 
each participant, thus we got total of 700 data items for 20 participants. Overall we 
got 3260 data items for analysis from questionnaires and log files. All of the data was 
transferred and recorded into Microsoft Excel workbooks for analysis and evaluation.  
5.2 EVALUATION 
In this section, we present the evaluation of the proposed system through the 
analysis of the system‟s design features and the results obtained from the usability 
study.  In the view of our previously defined goals (chapter 3) and objectives of this 
research, we consider the three major metrics for evaluating the proposed system. 
These are usability, security, and generality. Usability evaluation will provide an 
assurance that the system is easy to use for the users and they are satisfied with the 
way system works. Security evaluation will make sure that the objective of securing 
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communication between several entities of the system is achieved, along with 
providing confirmation of the physical proximity of the devices involved in the 
pairing process. Generality evaluation will ensure that the system is applicable in a 
large set of device pairing scenarios in ubiquitous computing environments, capable 
of incorporating existing pairing schemes, and can be extended without substantial 
effort. Apart from these main evaluations, we have also presented the performance 
analysis, combined metrics analysis of the eight PoP protocols and the proposed 
system, and the ranking analysis for the categories of PoP protocols.  
5.2.1 USABILITY EVALUATION 
The data obtained from both of the ASQs and post-test questionnaires 
revealed the participant‟s opinion of each of the test cases and their capability to 
perceive an appropriate pairing scheme for a given device pairing scenario. The 
participant‟s opinion is expressed in terms of rating scores on a scale of 1 to 7 in 
which 1 is representing the lowest score and 7 is representing the highest or the most 
satisfactory score. The selection of seven-step scale is based on the fact that it 
captures proper balance between reliability of scale and discriminative demand on the 
participants [95-97].  
The graphs shown in figures 5.2 and 5.3 are drawn from the data obtained 
from ASQ-1 and ASQ-2. Every participant recorded their satisfaction opinion for 
each of the test case by giving a score (i.e. 1-7) to each of the three measures on the 
ASQs. The graph in figure 5.2 shows the participants‟ rating view for each of the 
three measures. However in order to calculate the single score and to present the 
overall satisfaction of the participants for each of the test case, these scores are 
averaged and presented in figure 5.3. The results show that Button-to-Button pairing 
scheme is on top with the users average satisfaction score of 6.216. Display-Display 
and SiB has an average score of 6.1 and 6.15 respectively followed by CoLoc and 
CaS with the average satisfaction score of 5.616 and 5.556 respectively. Display-
Speaker has the lowest average satisfaction score of 4.85, while Blink-to-Button and 
Blink-Blink stands with an average satisfaction score of 5.416 and 5.106 respectively. 
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Figure 5.2: Users average rating score on a 7-step scale for the three measures of 
user‟s satisfaction 
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Figure 5.3: Users average satisfaction score on a 7-step scale for three measures 
It is well known in the literature of usability evaluations that an average score 
of 5.6 on a 7-step scale is considered to be satisfactory and acceptable for a system or 
product, while an average score of 4 is the acceptable score on a 5-step scale [98]. 
CoLoc has an average satisfaction score of 5.616 for the three measures of usability, 
which indicates that the proposed system is usable and practically feasible for its users.  
 
Figure 5.4: Participants response to question 2 (see appendix B.2) of the post-test 
questionnaire  
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The graph in figure 5.4 is drawn from the data collected as response to a 
scenario-based question. A scenario is presented to the participants on post-test 
questionnaire (see Q2 in appendix B.2) with a number of options and asked to select 
all of the possible pairing schemes. The correct response was Button-to-Button and 
Blink-to-Button. However, results in figure 5.4 show that many participants have 
selected the wrong pairing schemes as well along with the correct ones.  
Graphs in figure 5.5 and figure 5.6 are drawn from the data collected as 
response to another scenario-based question on post test questionnaire (see Q3 in 
appendix B.2). The scenario is presented to the participants with a smaller number of 
options and asked to select one of the best possible pairing schemes. The correct 
response is Button-to-Button. Results show that all of the participants (100%) selected 
Button-to-Button scheme, however 5% selected the Display-Speaker and 10% 
selected the Blink-to-Button scheme along with the Button-to-Button scheme. 
Considering the fact that Button-to-Button is the correct choice, it can be concluded 
that 85% of the participants have selected the right choice, while 15% of the 
participants have selected nearly correct response, but none has selected a totally 
wrong choice. 
 
Figure 5.5: Participants response to question 3 of the post-test questionnaire 
 - 99 - 
 
Figure 5.6: Interpreted results for response to question 3 of the post-test 
questionnaire 
The results presented in figure 5.4 reveal the fact that users are not good at 
identifying which pairing schemes are applicable in which scenarios. However, when 
users are given short listed pairing schemes, they performed well at identifying the 
suitable pairing schemes (figures 5.5 and 5.6). These results support our argument 
related to usability that ordinary users are not good at identifying appropriate schemes 
in a situation when they have to choose between many different pairing schemes; 
however if the cognitive overhead in terms of deciding/thinking an appropriate pairing 
scheme could be reduced, they are capable of performing very well in the pairing 
process. This result clearly supports our hypothesis that assistance in choosing a pairing 
scheme has value. 
5.2.2 SECURITY EVALUATION 
As stated earlier, the objective of security evaluation is to ensure that the 
proposed system is integrating the PoP protocols well and also securing the overall 
communication between several entities of the system. The security of device pairing 
schemes, where users are involved in security-related interactions, is evaluated in 
terms of safe errors and fatal errors [99]. Safe error denotes the systems inability to 
pair two legitimate co-located devices due to system error or user error in case of use 
of out-of-band channels. User errors are due to either very complicated steps of 
pairing, unclear instructions for the user to what to follow to achieve successful 
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pairing or user‟s own carelessness during the pairing process. Fatal error denotes the 
systems inability to prevent pairing of an adversary with a legitimate device of the 
system. Note that fatal errors are more dangerous and cause more serious 
consequences compared to safe errors. Fatal errors are not applicable in most of the 
schemes that involve users in only generating PoP data. In the case of our system, 
fatal errors are not applicable to button-based schemes and SiB. Since CoLoc 
incorporates these schemes and also it encrypts all the communication between the 
communicating partners, fatal errors are also not applicable to it.  
 
Figure 5.7: Safe and fatal errors for each of the test case 
When looking at the safe errors in figure 5.7, Display-Speaker has the largest 
safe error rate, while Display-Display, Selective Image Comparison, and Capture and 
Show have not even a single safe error. Button-to-Button and CoLoc have lower error 
rates as compared to the other schemes. CoLoc has an average error rate of only 2.5%. 
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When we performed a more detailed analysis of these errors, it comes to our notice 
that these 2.5% safe errors occurred when the participant selected Blink-to-Button as 
the PoP protocol during the execution of the proof-of-proximity phase, and the safe 
error rate of Blink-to-Button is already high in comparison to the other schemes, 
excluding Display-Speaker. This indicates that the rate of safe errors for CoLoc is 
somehow dependent on the selection of PoP protocol. These results indicate that the 
proposed system achieves its first security goal (i.e. demonstrating physical proximity 
of devices) very well. 
The second security goal is to make sure that the communication between 
several entities of the system is secure. We have achieved this goal through 
encrypting all the communication from resource registration until the end of the 
execution of the proof-of-proximity phase. The encrypted and integrity protected 
mode of communication used during the resource registration and discovery phase 
protect the pairing process from the bidding-down-attack. As stated earlier in chapter 
2, in this kind of attack, the goal of an adversary is to fool (bid-down) the intended pair-
able devices to use weaker security than is possible. For instance, when pairing two 
display and camera-equipped devices, an adversary could modify the capabilities of one 
of the devices into a display-less and/or camera-less device (bidding-down) to force a 
radio-based pairing protocol to be used, which is easier to intercept without being 
detected. Additionally, when the proposed system is implemented considering the 
assumptions provided in chapter 3, it is also secure against MiTM attack. These facts 
indicate that beside the usability, the proposed system also achieves its security goals. 
5.2.3 GENERALITY EVALUATION 
The purpose of generality evaluation is to make sure that the system is 
capable of incorporating existing pairing schemes, as well as being extendable 
without substantial modifications in the design, and being applicable in a large set of 
device pairing scenarios in ubiquitous computing environments. Towards this, we 
have already shown in the previous chapter (implementation) that CoLoc is capable of 
integrating several pairing schemes (known as PoP protocols in this dissertation) to 
authenticate the physical proximity of the devices. Further, in addition to establishing 
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a secure session between two previously unassociated devices, the proposed system is 
also capable of establishing secure group communication, creating and managing 
long-term pairings, and also offers a mechanism for the selection of PoP protocol that 
gives some control to the user. Moreover, the system is designed in a way that it can 
be extended without substantial effort. We are defining extension from two different 
points of view: the developers/programmers‟ point of view and the deployment point 
of view. 
From the developers‟ point of view, they can add a new PoP protocol to the 
system by performing following steps: 
 Firstly, they are required to include specifications for the new PoP 
protocol in the XML-based policy file. 
 Secondly, they are required to write the PoP protocol implementation 
code in Java, which needs to be included into proof-of-proximity 
software component. 
From a deployment point of view, the proposed system is capable of being 
deployed to multiple servers; thus facilitating the secure association of a pair of 
devices, each of which belongs to a different co-location server.  
Primary CoLocServer
CoLocServer 1 CoLocServer 2
 Perform automatic pairing 
Automatic sensors 
attached
Automatic sensors 
attached
 
 
Figure 5.8: Scenario depicting the deployment of multiple co-location servers 
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Figure 5.8 shows the scenario of multiple co-location servers. In fact, it is 
similar to a single co-location server‟s scenario, where devices use the server as a 
mediator. Now the Primary ColocServer serves as a mediator for the other two 
servers (i.e. ColocServer1 and ColocServer2). These two servers can authenticate 
each other by either using an automatic pairing scheme, or with the help of a 
user/administrator using any other category of pairing schemes. Once these two 
servers are in a paired state, they can securely exchange the device‟s profiles to each 
other depending on the received queries from their clients. 
In summary, the proposed system is designed in such a generic way that it is 
not restricted to any particular set of PoP protocols. It can be used with various types 
of PoP protocols or same PoP protocols, but with different selection criteria based on 
the scenario in which it is deployed. We have also shown that the proposed system is 
capable of getting user‟s preferences and considers them during the PoP protocols 
selection phase. The protocol selection mechanism (section 3.6) uses an XML-based 
policy as PoP protocols selection criteria, which is mainly defined in terms of 
required device capabilities and constraints over PoP protocols. Since the criterion for 
the selection of PoP protocols is described in an XML-based protocol specification 
and selection policy file; it can be changed / modified at run-time. Moreover, we also 
showed in chapter 3 (section 3.7) that the proposed system is extendable without 
changing the core design of the system and without substantial effort. All of these 
features indicate that the proposed is generic enough that it can cover a wide range of 
device pairing scenarios in ubiquitous computing environments in terms of both two 
device setting and group pairing. 
5.2.4 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
The data obtained from both log files became the basis for performance 
analysis of the proposed system and the eight pairing schemes. Performance analysis 
is based on the average task completion times and the average task completion rates 
for each of the test cases. The graph presented in figure 5.9 shows the average task 
completion time along with the standard deviation. It shows that Button-to-Button and 
SiB schemes are faster than all of the other schemes. Their average task completion 
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times are 19.161 and 20.209 seconds respectively. Blink-to-Button and SiC have 
similar approximate average task completion times. Similarly, Blink-Blink and CaS 
have similar approximate average task completion times. CoLoc has the largest 
average task completion time. Since CoLoc incorporates several PoP schemes as sub- 
protocols, it is the fact that the task completion time for CoLoc is dependent on the 
chosen PoP protocol. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Average task completion time with standard deviation 
 
Refer to the graph shown in figure 5.10 for task completion rates. The task 
completion rate for all of the schemes is good. The only schemes that could not 
achieve 100% completion rate are Blink-to-Button with 95% completion rate, Blink-
Blink with 85% completion rate and Display-Speaker with 90% completion rate.  
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Figure 5.10:  Task completion rate for each of the test case 
Prior to performing the combined metrics analysis, we present the categorized 
summary of the usability study results in table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2: The categorized summary of the overall results 
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5.2.5 COMBINED METRICS ANALYSIS 
We calculated a single score from the collected raw data using the Single 
Usability Metric (SUM) model [100, 101] to rank each of the tested pairing schemes 
and the proposed system. SUM was originally introduced by Sauro and Kindlund 
[100] . It is a single, summated and standardized usability evaluation metric, which is 
based on the ANSI [102]  and the ISO 9241 pt. 11 [103] defined dimension of 
usability. A SUM score is calculated from the four usability evaluation metrics, which 
are: post-task satisfaction, task completion rate, average completion time of task, and 
average number of errors. These four metrics are aggregated into a single measure 
(known as SUM score) through the standardization process outlined in [104]. 
 
Table 5.3: Overall ranking of schemes based on SUM scores 
In order to avoid any errors in calculation, we have used an Ms Excel utility 
package to calculate the SUM score, which is designed by Sauro and available from 
[105]. This utility follows the original calculation process of the SUM score as 
outlined in [104] and contains the required pre-set functions, formulas and a set of 
sample data for illustration purposes. We entered all of the collected raw data into the 
downloaded spreadsheet package according to the specified rules and format, and 
finally got the results presented in table 5.3 using the confidence level of 95%. 
According to these results, SiB has the highest SUM score, while Display-Speaker has 
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the lowest. Our proposed system is fourth with a SUM score of 72.2%, which 
interestingly out performs most of the schemes that are tested independent of the 
proposed system and do not include device registration and discovery phases. 
5.3 WIDER VIEW OF USABILITY STUDY RESULTS 
5.3.1 CATEGORIES RANKING 
Graphs shown in figures 5.11 are drawn from the data obtained through post-
test questionnaire (Q1 in appendix B.2). Results show the ranking for each of the 
category of PoP scheme as given by the participants. Note (as stated earlier) that 
category-1 is that in which user is involved in generating PoP data; category-2 is that 
in which user is responsible for verifying the PoP data; and category-3 is that in which 
user is involved in both generating the PoP data and verifying it. Category-1 consists 
of Button-to-Button, Blink-to-Button and Seeing is Believing schemes. Category-2 is 
composed of Blink-Blink, Display-Display and Display-Speaker schemes. Category-3 
consists of Selective Image Comparison and Capture and Show schemes.  
Results show that 85% of the participants ranked category-1 as the number 
one; it is ranked as number two by 15% participants, and none has ranked it as 
number three. Category-2 is ranked as number one by 15% participants; it is ranked as 
number two by 35% participants, and 50% of the participants ranked it as number 
three. In the case of category-3, none has ranked it as number one, however 50% of 
the participants ranked it as number two and remaining 50% of the participants ranked 
it as number three.  These results revealed that most of the participants preferred the 
first category of PoP protocols in which they were involved in generating PoP data. 
None of the participants ranked the third category of PoP protocols as their favourite, 
while second category has a moderate ranking as few have ranked it first, some have 
ranked it second and the remaining ranked it third. Further, in category-1 the most 
preferred or satisfactory PoP protocol is Button-to-Button, in category-2 the most 
preferred PoP protocol is Display-Display, and in category-3 the most preferred PoP 
protocol is Capture and Show. These results suggest that users usually prefer to take 
part and willing to be involved in the pairing process. However, some of them prefer 
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to be involved at the beginning of the proof-of-proximity phase in order to generate 
the PoP data, while others prefer to be involved during the last steps for verification 
of the PoP data; but majority of the users do not prefer to be involved in the process 
from the beginning to end of the pairing process. This advocates the fact that user 
involvement in the secure pairing process is unavoidable [106]; however users do not 
prefer excessive and unrestrained involvement or interactions during the pairing 
process. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Category-wise ranking of pairing schemes  
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5.3.2 IMPACT OF GENDER 
The usability study participants‟ recruitment process was performed without 
controlling any balance on the participant dependant variables, such as age and 
gender. Since there was little difference in the sample size for each gender (55% male 
and 45% female), we performed unpaired t-tests to investigate the effect of gender on 
average completion time and user satisfaction rating scores. Test results revealed that 
there is not a statistically significant effect of gender on participants‟ satisfaction 
ratings and task completion time.  
5.3.3 IMPACT ON THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
The usability study of the eight pairing schemes has an impact on the 
proposed system. The results are useful in improving the PoP protocol selection 
mechanism. Particularly, the SUM score can be used to prioritize the PoP protocols. 
In this case, the decision mechanism used to set the recommended order of the PoP 
protocols would also consider the ranking as produced by the SUM score. 
Further, categories ranking analysis presented in section 5.3.1 has also an 
impact on the protocol selection mechanism. Refer to section 3.6 in which we have 
described an XML-based PoP protocol specification and selection policy (figure 
3.13). We have mentioned that the value of <UILevel> tag represents the level of 
required user interaction or involvement during the execution of the PoP protocol. „1‟ 
represents the low or minimum level of user interaction and „3‟ represents the high or 
maximum level of user interaction. The PoP protocols belonging to the category-1 and 
category-2 come under the categories of protocol that require low level of user 
interaction, while the category-3 comes under the category of protocols that require 
high level of user interaction. However, the ranking analysis proved to be helpful in 
drawing the scope for a set of protocols that require moderate level of user 
interaction. Based on the categories ranking analysis, we have put the PoP protocols 
belonging to category-2 under those protocols that require moderate level of user 
interaction (or more precisely moderate level of user attention). 
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5.4 SUMMARY 
The detail of the usability study is presented along with the analysis of the 
results and evaluation of the proposed system. The analysis and evaluation supports 
the assertion that the integration of the discovery mechanism and several proof-of-
proximity protocols into a single system is a more effective approach to device pairing 
as compared to proposing and developing a plethora of pairing protocols that work in 
a totally independent fashion. It is also highlighted that most of the recent work on 
device pairing has given less importance to certain aspects of device pairing, such as 
credential revocations and device un-pairing mechanisms. We not only realized the 
importance of such aspects of device pairing, but also incorporated them in the 
proposed system. In view of these facts, we believe that our work is an important and 
timely first step in academic research that highlights the need of a framework based 
approach to device pairing. Our work helps with answering several questions relevant 
to secure device pairing. These include: 1) are the users good at remembering several 
steps of dozens of pairing schemes for a number of device pairing scenarios and 
situations; 2) are they capable of performing well when cognitive overhead would be 
reduced; 3) are the users willing to be involved in the pairing process, and if yes, then 
to what extent; and most importantly 4) are the frame-work based approaches feasible 
for tackling the issue of device pairing in ubiquitous computing environments. The 
task of answering these questions was at least very difficult, if not impossible, before 
the work presented in this dissertation. 
The additional results obtained from the usability study are in favour of a 
widely accepted view on the part of academic researchers, and the device 
manufacturers or industrial researchers that some form of human involvement in the 
secure pairing process is unavoidable [106]; however, the results also indicated that 
human users are interested in moderate involvement. They do not want to be 
overburdened with human-to-device interactions. The usability study results of 8 
pairing schemes are also useful in improving the protocol selection criteria. Finally, 
we believe that the results and findings of this work motivates the research 
community to re-think the issue of secure device pairing and come up with a more 
standardized, common and universal solution. 
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CHAPTER 6  
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this very last chapter, we present the summary of the overall work presented 
in this dissertation followed by the summary of the contributions, and future 
work. At the end of this chapter, we conclude this dissertation with closing 
remarks. 
 
6.1 RECAPITULATION 
We are moving towards a world in which computing is omnipresent and the 
security and privacy remain to be a major concern for this computing world – from 
traditional wired networks to modern ad hoc and ubiquitous computing systems. 
Ubiquitous computing systems differ from more traditional computing systems due to 
the ad-hoc and spontaneous nature of interactions among devices. Most of the time, 
these systems are composed of modern small, handheld or embedded devices, which 
support wireless communication in some form. Since ubiquitous computing systems 
use wireless communication, these are prone to security risks, such as eavesdropping, 
and require different techniques as compared to traditional security mechanisms. 
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Consequently, the problem of secure device pairing for ad hoc and ubiquitous 
comporting environments has had significant attention from many researchers during 
the last 10 years and a significant set of techniques and protocols have been proposed. 
More recently numerous standardization and industrial bodies, (such as Microsoft, 
WiFi Alliance, Bluetooth Special Interest Group, and the Universal Serial Bus (USB) 
Forum) have also recognized the significance of this problem, and are working on 
specifying more general, usable, and secure procedures for device pairing. However, 
as we have shown in our detailed analysis of the state-of-the-art in chapter 2, currently 
available schemes for secure device pairing vary in their security against different 
attacks, in the needed hardware capabilities and in the necessary level of user 
attention. Some of these techniques consider devices equipped with infrared, laser or 
ultrasound transceivers, whilst others require embedded accelerometers, cameras 
and/or LEDs, display, microphone and/or speakers. Some techniques exploit the 
knowledge of radio environment to securely pair the devices; others require the user‟s 
careful attention and significant manual intervention in pairing process.  
We advocated that if we continue to multiply the pairing protocols each of 
which is feasible for certain scenarios only, users might be confused about the 
selection of appropriate pairing schemes as well as about the steps to follow them due 
to cognitive overhead of remembering several steps of dozens of pairing schemes. For 
instance, a user wanting to create an association of two mobile phones having a 
microphone, accelerometer, speaker, camera, display and infrared might be confused 
about the varied types of possibilities of device pairing protocols. We also advocate 
that in a world of modern heterogeneous devices and requirements, we need 
mechanisms to allow automated selection of the best protocols without requiring the 
user to have an in-depth knowledge of the minutiae of the underlying technologies. In 
view of that, at the end of chapter 2, we argued that it is appropriate to investigate 
ways of integrating different pairing protocols within a general architecture for 
providing secure and usable pairing mechanisms for a large set of scenarios in 
ubiquitous computing environments. As a consequence, we proposed a framework 
based approach to device pairing by demonstration of physical proximity. In chapter 
3, we presented the three major goals of the system – usability, security and generality 
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– followed by the details of the proposed framework along with CoLoc protocol and 
PoP protocol selection mechanism. The key features of the PoP framework are: 
Secure and Generic: The PoP framework integrates the discovery mechanism and a 
number of different pairing schemes mainly identified and discussed in chapter 2 of 
this dissertation. Since none of the surveyed discovery systems in their original form 
were found to be suitable in for integration and prototype implementation of the PoP 
framework in terms of complexity and the features offered by these systems, we 
designed our own confidentiality and integrity protected device registration and 
discovery mechanism through combining several features of the existing well known 
discovery systems. As a consequence, we showed that this way the proposed 
framework is able to provide support for various PoP protocols along with integrity 
and confidentiality protected device discovery, and thereby comprehensively provides 
support for a wide range of device pairing scenarios in ubiquitous computing 
environments. 
Dynamic PoP protocol selection mechanism: The proposed framework follows a 
PoP protocols specification and selection policy when selecting a PoP protocol based 
on device capabilities and user preferences. The PoP protocol specification and 
selection mechanism is defined in an XML-based policy file. The XML-based policy 
allows modifying the protocol selection criterion at runtime. A runtime modification 
of the protocol selection criterion is useful for customizing the PoP protocol selection 
mechanism according to an individual user‟s or enterprise needs and preferences 
which were not foreseen at the time of deployment. 
We showed the implementation of the proposed system and the CoLoc 
protocol along with the details of the software components and classification of the 
PoP protocols in chapter 4. The details of the usability study along with the evaluation 
of the proposed system were presented in chapter 5. The proposed system is evaluated 
through the analysis of the system‟s design features and the results obtained from the 
usability study. Evaluation demonstrated that the proposed system achieved its 
defined goals well.  
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6.2 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
We are summarizing the main contribution of this dissertation as the design 
and implementation of a Proof-of-Proximity framework for device pairing in 
ubiquitous computing environments along with the CoLoc protocol. The other 
contributions include a detailed critical and comparative analysis of the device pairing 
schemes, a simple device discovery mechanism, a protocol selection mechanism that 
is used to find the best possible scheme(s) to demonstrate the physical proximity of 
the devices according to the scenario/situation, and a usability study of eight pairing 
schemes along with the proposed system.  
6.3 FUTURE WORK 
The research work presented in this dissertation is complete in itself; however 
it has potential to be extended in order to further increase its efficiency and usage 
scenarios. Following is a non-exhausting list of possible future extensions to this work. 
 The current prototype implementation of the proposed system utilizes a co-
location server in order to store and manage the devices‟ profiles, however it 
is also possible that the proposed system could be implemented without the 
co-location server, in which case the devices are responsible to maintain the 
directory (as in SLP architecture there are two modes: directory based and 
directory-less). Alternatively, a directory-less implementation of the proposed 
system is also possible in which case instead of directory component, an out-
of-band software component is required that should be responsible for secure 
exchange of the devices‟ capabilities information. 
 We have performed usability study of some of the PoP protocols; however 
there is need for an exhaustive and more detailed usability study of the 
existing PoP protocols as well as new novel PoP protocols in more realistic 
scenarios and with more real-world and more diverse devices, such as mobile 
phones, PDAs, laptops. Further, we have also planned to extend the PoP 
protocol selection mechanism in such a way so that it takes into account the 
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results of the usability study. The impact of the usability study results on the 
proposed system is already described in section 5.3.3. 
 The device registration and discovery process can be standardized using 
existing standards, such as CC/PP [107], for describing device profiles and 
discovery queries. Alternatively, the proposed system has also potential to be 
integrated with such a discovery mechanism that provide confidentiality and 
integrity during the registration and discovery process and also facilitates with 
the directory service in order to manage and maintain the device‟s profiles.  
 Since we have implemented a simple protocol selection and specification 
policy, there is need to develop more efficient and usable policies, which in 
turn requires more exhaustive and real word usability testing of the proposed 
framework.  
6.4 CLOSING REMARKS 
It is noted that our focus in this work had been more on the ways of 
integrating the discovery mechanism and PoP protocols into one generic system for 
ubiquitous computing environments with minimal or non-substantial requirements, 
rather than on ways of providing new device pairing mechanisms each of which is 
feasible for an individual or particular scenario/situation of a completely ad hoc or 
infrastructure-less environment. Therefore, we believe that this work can be extended 
in two ways. Firstly, through performing a careful and more detailed analysis and/or 
usability of the existing pairing schemes in order to integrate more useful and realistic 
PoP protocols in the proposed framework as well as creating the new novel PoP 
protocols considering the design of the proposed framework. Secondly, as the 
proposed framework has potential to be used in peer-to-peer scenarios where there is 
no need of co-location server, so it can be extended in order to work in fully-
infrastructure-less environments. 
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APPENDIX A ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
B-to-B Button to Button 
CaS Capture and Show 
CC/PP Composite Capabilities/Preference Profile 
CoLoc Co-Location Protocol 
DoS Denial of Service 
DTD Document Type Definition 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
LED Light Emitting Diode 
MAC Message Authentication Code 
MiTM Man-in-The-Middle 
NFC Near Field Communication 
OOB Out-of-Band 
PDA Personal Digital Assistant 
PoP Proof-of-Proximity 
SiB Seeing-is-Believing 
SIC Selective Image Comparison 
SIG Special Interest Group 
SLP Service Location Protocol 
SSP Secure Simple Pairing 
UPnP Universal Plug and Play 
XML Extensible Markup Language 
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APPENDIX B.1 PRE-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Participant’s Demographic Information 
Please circle (e.g. © ) an option as appropriate for each of the following. 
(1) Please specify your age group: 
a. 18 – 25  
b. 26 – 40  
c. 41 or above  
 
(2) Sex: 
a. Male  
b. Female  
 
(3) Highest academic qualification: 
a. High School/College 
b. Bachelors Degree 
c. Masters Degree 
d. Doctorate (PhD) 
 
(4) How many hours usually do you work with computer in a day since last one year? 
(You can give an average estimate). 
a. 2 or less hours 
b. 3 – 5 hours 
c. 6  or above hours 
 
(5) Do you have experience of pairing devices (e.g. pairing a Bluetooth-enabled headset 
with MP3 player or the pairing of two mobile phones)? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
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APPENDIX B.2 POST-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
Please answer the following questions based on your experience of the performed 
usability test of pairing schemes/methods. 
 
(1) Please rank the following three categories of pairing schemes by numbering them (i.e. 
from 1 to 3). 
a. Selective Image Comparison and Capture and Show:  _________ 
b. Button-to-Button, Blink-to-Button  and Seeing is Believing:  _________ 
c. Blink-Blink, Display-Display and Display-Speaker:  _________ 
(2) Consider the scenario that you have to pair a mobile phone having display, speaker and 
keypad capabilities with a printer having very limited display, LEDs and buttons on it in 
a noisy environment. Please select all of the pairing schemes that you think are 
applicable in this scenario. 
a. Button-to-Button (B-to-B)   
b. Blink-to-Button (Blink-to-B)   
c. Seeing is Believing (SiB)    
d. Blink-Blink     
e. Display-Display     
f. Display-Speaker     
g. Selective Image Comparison (SiC)   
h. Capture and Show (CaS)    
i. Don‟t know 
(3) If you have to pair a mobile phone having display, speaker and keypad capabilities 
with a printer having very limited display, LEDs and buttons on it, then which of the 
following do you think is the best scheme to pair these two devices? 
a. Button-to-Button (B-to-B) 
b. Display-Speaker     
c. Blink-to-Button (Blink-to-B) 
d. Blink-Blink 
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(4) We would appreciate it, if you could give any suggestions or comments that you think 
will help us to improve the proposed system. Please also feel free to discuss your 
general feedback orally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thanks for giving your valuable time and feedback 
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APPENDIX B.3 AFTER SCENARIO QUESTIONNAIRE – 1  
 
 
 
Please rate the usability of the pairing schemes used during the previous phase. 
Please circle the score/number (i.e. 1 is the lowest score and 7 is the highest score) 
that you think is appropriate for each of the presented items. 
 
(A) Button-to-Button (B-to-B) Pairing Scheme 
(1) How would you describe how difficult or easy it was to complete the Button-to-Button 
pairing scheme? 
Very Difficult      Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(2) How satisfied are you with using Button-to-Button pairing scheme to pair the two devices? 
Very Unsatisfied      Very Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(3) How would you rate the amount of time Button-to-Button pairing scheme took to complete 
the pairing process? 
Too Much Time      Very Little Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(B) Blink-to-Button (Blink-to-B) Pairing Scheme 
(4) How would you describe how difficult or easy it was to complete the Blink-to-Button 
pairing scheme? 
Very Difficult      Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(5) How satisfied are you with using Blink-to-Button pairing scheme to pair the two devices? 
Very Unsatisfied      Very Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(6) How would you rate the amount of time Blink-to-Button pairing scheme took to complete 
the pairing process? 
Too Much Time      Very Little Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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(C) Seeing is Believing (SiB) Pairing Scheme 
(7) How would you describe how difficult or easy it was to complete the Seeing is Believing 
pairing scheme? 
Very Difficult      Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(8) How satisfied are you with using Seeing is Believing pairing scheme to pair the two 
devices? 
Very Unsatisfied      Very Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(9) How would you rate the amount of time Seeing is Believing pairing scheme took to 
complete the pairing process? 
Too Much Time      Very Little Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(D) Blink-Blink Pairing Scheme 
(10) How would you describe how difficult or easy it was to complete the Blink-Blink pairing 
scheme? 
Very Difficult      Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(11) How satisfied are you with using Blink-Blink pairing scheme to pair the two devices? 
Very Unsatisfied      Very Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(12) How would you rate the amount of time Blink-Blink pairing scheme took to complete the 
pairing process? 
Too Much Time      Very Little Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(E) Display-Display Pairing Scheme 
(13) How would you describe how difficult or easy it was to complete the Display-Display 
pairing scheme? 
Very Difficult      Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(14) How satisfied are you with using Display-Display pairing scheme to pair the two devices? 
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Very Unsatisfied      Very Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(15) How would you rate the amount of time Display-Display pairing scheme took to complete 
the pairing process? 
Too Much Time      Very Little Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(F) Display-Speaker Pairing Scheme 
(16) How would you describe how difficult or easy it was to complete the Display-Speaker pairing 
scheme? 
Very Difficult      Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(17) How satisfied are you with using Display-Speaker pairing scheme to pair the two devices? 
Very Unsatisfied      Very Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(18) How would you rate the amount of time Display-Speaker pairing scheme took to complete 
the pairing process? 
Too Much Time      Very Little Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(G) Selective Image Comparison (SiC) Pairing Scheme 
(19) How would you describe how difficult or easy it was to complete the Selective Image 
Comparison pairing scheme? 
Very Difficult      Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(20) How satisfied are you with using Selective Image Comparison pairing scheme to pair the 
two devices? 
Very Unsatisfied      Very Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(21) How  would you rate the amount of time Selective Image Comparison scheme took to 
complete the pairing process? 
Too Much Time      Very Little Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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(H) Capture and Show (CaS) Pairing Scheme 
(22) How would you describe how difficult or easy it was to complete the Capture and Show 
pairing scheme? 
Very Difficult      Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(23) How satisfied are you with using Capture and Show pairing scheme to pair the two 
devices? 
Very Unsatisfied      Very Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(24) How would you rate the amount of time Capture and Show pairing scheme took to 
complete the pairing process? 
Too Much Time      Very Little Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX B.4  AFTER SCENARIO QUESTIONNAIRE – 2  
 
 
 
Please rate the usability of the device pairing system used during the previous 
phase (second part). Please circle the score/number (i.e. 1 is the lowest score and 7 
is the highest score) that you think is appropriate for each of the presented items. 
 
(A) Device Pairing by Demonstration of Physical Proximity System 
(1) How would you describe how difficult or easy it was to complete the device pairing 
process using that system? 
Very Difficult      Very Easy 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(2) How satisfied are you with using the system to pair the two devices? 
Very Unsatisfied      Very Satisfied 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(3) How would you rate the amount of time the system took to complete the pairing process? 
Too Much Time      Very Little Time 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX C DOCUMENT TYPE DEFINITIONS (DTDS) 
 
 
 
1. DTD for PoP Protocol Specification and Selection Policy 
 
<!ELEMENT PSPolicy ( Protocol+ ) > 
<!ELEMENT Protocol ( Name, Type, ClCapabilities, ResCapabilities,  
ProximityLimit, UILevel, Constraints?) > 
<!ELEMENT Name ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT Type ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT ClCapabilities ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT ResCapabilities ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT ProximityLimit ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT UILevel ( #PCDATA ) > 
<!ELEMENT Constraints ( #PCDATA ) > 
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APPENDIX D    RAW DATA OBTAINED FROM QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
 
 
D.1: Table of raw data for question 1 of the post-test questionnaire 
 
User Ranked as 1 Ranked as 2 Ranked as 3 
1 1 3 2 
2 1 3 2 
3 1 3 2 
4 1 3 2 
5 1 2 3 
6 1 3 2 
7 1 2 3 
8 1 3 2 
9 2 1 3 
10 1 2 3 
11 1 2 3 
12 1 2 3 
13 2 1 3 
14 1 3 2 
15 1 3 2 
16 1 2 3 
17 2 1 3 
18 1 2 3 
19 1 3 2 
20 1 3 2 
 
Key for columns 2, 3 and 4 : 
           1 denotes category-1 
           2 denotes category-2 
           3 denotes category-3 
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D.2: Table of raw data for question 2 of the post-test questionnaire 
 
User 
Button-to-
Button 
Blink-to-
Button SiB 
Blink-
Blink 
Display-
Display 
Display-
Speaker SiC CaS 
Don't 
Know 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
2 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
3 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
5 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
7 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
8 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
9 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
10 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
12 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
14 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
15 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
16 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
17 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
18 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
19 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
20 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Key for columns 2 to 9: 
           1 denotes that user selected the choice that is shown in the column heading 
           0 denotes that user did not select the choice that is shown in the column heading 
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D.3: Table of raw data for question 3 of the post-test questionnaire 
 
User B-to-B Display-Speaker Blink-to-B Blink-Blink 
1 1 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 
4 1 0 0 0 
5 1 0 0 0 
6 1 0 0 0 
7 1 0 0 0 
8 1 0 0 0 
9 1 0 0 0 
10 1 0 0 0 
11 1 0 0 0 
12 1 0 0 0 
13 1 0 1 0 
14 1 1 0 0 
15 1 0 0 0 
16 1 0 1 0 
17 1 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0 0 
19 1 0 0 0 
20 1 0 0 0 
 
Key for columns 2 to 5: 
           1 denotes that user selected the choice that is shown in the column heading 
           0 denotes that user did not select the choice that is shown in the column heading 
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KEY FOR SUBSEQUENT TABLES: 
Sat-Score1: user rating for the question: 
 How would you describe how difficult or easy it was to complete the 
<PairingSchemeName> pairing scheme?  
Sat-Score2: user rating for the question: 
How satisfied are you with using <PairingSchemeName> pairing 
scheme to pair the two devices? 
Sat-Score3: user rating for the question:  
How would you rate the amount of time <PairingSchemeName> 
pairing scheme took to complete the pairing process? 
Also note that values in columns 1 to 3 indicates the score as given by the 
user where 1 is the lowest score and 7 is the highest score.  
 
D.4: Table of raw data for Button-to-Button scheme obtained from ASQ1 
 
 
User Sat-Score1 Sat-Score2 Sat-Score3 
1 6 6 6 
2 7 6 7 
3 5 6 6 
4 7 7 6 
5 6 6 6 
6 7 7 7 
7 7 7 7 
8 7 6 6 
9 6 6 6 
10 6 7 7 
11 7 7 7 
12 5 5 5 
13 6 6 6 
14 7 6 6 
15 6 6 6 
16 7 6 7 
17 5 5 5 
18 6 6 6 
19 6 6 6 
20 7 6 6 
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D.5: Table of raw data for Blink-to-Button scheme obtained from ASQ1 
 
 
User Sat-Score1 Sat-Score2 Sat-Score3 
1 5 6 6 
2 6 6 6 
3 5 5 6 
4 6 6 5 
5 6 6 6 
6 5 6 6 
7 6 5 6 
8 6 5 6 
9 5 6 5 
10 6 6 6 
11 5 5 5 
12 6 6 6 
13 6 5 5 
14 5 6 6 
15 5 4 5 
16 5 6 5 
17 5 4 5 
18 6 5 5 
19 4 4 5 
20 5 5 5 
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D.6: Table of raw data for SiB scheme obtained from ASQ1 
 
 
User Sat-Score1 Sat-Score2 Sat-Score3 
1 6 7 6 
2 7 6 6 
3 6 6 6 
4 6 6 6 
5 6 6 7 
6 7 7 7 
7 6 7 6 
8 6 6 6 
9 6 6 7 
10 6 6 6 
11 6 6 6 
12 7 6 6 
13 6 6 6 
14 6 6 6 
15 6 6 6 
16 6 6 6 
17 6 6 6 
18 6 6 6 
19 6 6 6 
20 6 6 6 
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D.7: Table of raw data for Blink-Blink scheme obtained from ASQ1 
 
 
User Sat-Score1 Sat-Score2 Sat-Score3 
1 5 6 5 
2 6 6 5 
3 5 5 5 
4 6 5 5 
5 6 6 5 
6 5 5 5 
7 5 6 5 
8 5 4 5 
9 5 5 4 
10 5 4 5 
11 6 5 5 
12 5 5 5 
13 6 5 6 
14 5 5 5 
15 6 5 4 
16 4 4 4 
17 5 6 6 
18 4 4 5 
19 5 5 4 
20 5 4 4 
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D.8: Table of raw data for Display-Display scheme obtained from ASQ1 
 
 
User Sat-Score1 Sat-Score2 Sat-Score3 
1 7 6 6 
2 6 6 6 
3 7 6 6 
4 7 6 6 
5 5 6 6 
6 6 6 6 
7 7 6 6 
8 6 6 6 
9 6 6 6 
10 6 6 6 
11 7 7 6 
12 6 6 6 
13 7 6 7 
14 6 6 6 
15 7 6 6 
16 7 7 6 
17 6 6 6 
18 6 6 5 
19 5 5 5 
20 6 6 6 
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D.9: Table of raw data for Display-Speaker scheme obtained from ASQ1 
 
 
User Sat-Score1 Sat-Score2 Sat-Score3 
1 5 4 6 
2 5 5 6 
3 5 4 5 
4 5 4 5 
5 5 4 6 
6 5 4 6 
7 4 4 5 
8 5 4 5 
9 5 4 5 
10 5 4 6 
11 4 4 5 
12 4 4 5 
13 6 5 5 
14 5 4 5 
15 5 5 5 
16 6 4 5 
17 6 5 6 
18 6 5 5 
19 4 4 5 
20 5 4 5 
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D.10: Table of raw data for SIC scheme obtained from ASQ1 
 
 
User Sat-Score1 Sat-Score2 Sat-Score3 
1 5 5 6 
2 6 5 6 
3 5 6 6 
4 6 6 6 
5 5 6 6 
6 6 6 6 
7 4 4 5 
8 6 5 6 
9 5 5 5 
10 5 5 5 
11 5 5 5 
12 5 5 4 
13 5 4 5 
14 5 5 5 
15 5 5 6 
16 6 5 5 
17 6 5 6 
18 5 5 5 
19 5 5 5 
20 5 5 5 
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D.11: Table of raw data for CaS scheme obtained from ASQ1 
 
 
User Sat-Score1 Sat-Score2 Sat-Score3 
1 6 5 5 
2 6 6 6 
3 6 6 6 
4 6 7 6 
5 6 5 6 
6 6 6 6 
7 5 6 5 
8 6 6 6 
9 6 5 6 
10 6 5 5 
11 6 6 5 
12 5 5 5 
13 5 4 5 
14 6 5 5 
15 6 5 6 
16 6 6 5 
17 6 6 6 
18 6 5 5 
19 5 5 5 
20 6 5 5 
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D.12: Table of raw data for CoLoc scheme obtained from ASQ2 
 
 
User Sat-Score1 Sat-Score2 Sat-Score3 
1 6 6 5 
2 6 6 5 
3 5 6 5 
4 5 6 6 
5 6 5 6 
6 7 7 7 
7 6 6 7 
8 6 6 5 
9 5 5 5 
10 5 6 6 
11 6 7 7 
12 5 6 5 
13 5 6 5 
14 6 5 6 
15 5 6 5 
16 5 6 6 
17 5 5 5 
18 6 5 5 
19 4 5 6 
20 5 6 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
